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Abstract:
This essay synthesizes recent writing on the constitutional history of slavery, featuring Mark
Graber’s Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil (2006). It offers a historical and
legal analysis of Dred Scott that attempts to clarify the roles of both law and politics in
controversial judicial decisions. It joins Graber in rehabilitating Chief Justice Taney’s Dred
Scott opinion as a plausible implementation of a Constitution that was born in slavery and grew
only more suffused with slavery over time. It integrates much recent writing on the social,
political, and constitutional history of slavery to develop the context in which the Dred Scott
opinions must be read. And it finds that Justice Curtis’s celebrated dissent amounted to an
unjudicial manipulation of the law, not the judicial masterpiece of historiographical lore,
although driven by the higher purpose of striking at the political hegemony of the slaveholding
class.
This essay is an unabridged version of a shorter work that is forthcoming in Law and
Social Inquiry (Summer 2009).
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INTRODUCTION
What makes a judicial opinion specially political? Do we just know it when we see it? In
a time when no legal scholar believes that adjudication, especially at the Supreme Court, can be
apolitical, is it worthwhile or even possible to identify those opinions that are specially
“political”? These questions are raised for me by recent scholarship that attempts to rehabilitate
the Court’s judgment and reasoning in the famously political Dred Scott decision, the 1857 case
that denied Congress authority to prevent the expansion of slavery, denied black Americans
citizenship simply by virtue of their descent from slaves, and perhaps helped to bring on the
Civil War. Although the decision is deeply offensive now, and was so even in 1857 to many
Americans, I agree with the general thrust of the revisionist work on this case and, in this essay,
mean to go a step further. I will argue that, in fact, Chief Justice Taney’s opinion represented an
effort to vindicate law as an alternative to violence, whereas Justice Curtis’s celebrated dissent
evinced a lawless--though perhaps admirable--determination to put the South in its place.
For a good while now, judges and scholars have unanimously condemned Chief Justice
Taney’s opinion as inexcusably partisan. In doing so, and in criticizing other opinions as
excessively political, scholars of the judicial process have evinced a need to understand how the
judicial mode of governance relates to the legislative, executive, and administrative modes and to
principles of popular governance more generally. Especially in the politically charged arena of
constitutional review, scholars have sought to understand how different public actors interact to
establish the meaning of the Constitution (Keck 2007; Whittington 2007; Whittington 1999;
Leonard 2002; Leonard 2001; Ackerman 1991; Kramer 2004; Graber forthcoming). And in some
cases that means that we want to know when the judiciary has exercised (or usurped) authority
plausibly claimed by some other institution or process.
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Treatments of this question, though, often end up condemning the Supreme Court for
rendering this or that “political” decision, without adequately explaining what makes the
decision more political than so many others.1 Historians often ask whether a particular judicial
decision was genuinely driven by law or by politics. But the literature offers no standard for
judging a judicial opinion excessively political unless we just measure the degree of offense the
opinion gives to our own political beliefs.
By this measure, the 1857 case of Dred Scott was about as political a case as one could
imagine, and it has only gotten more political over time as the nation has become more widely
averse not only to slavery but to the unabashed racism of the opinion. In that case, a mostly
Southern majority of the Court entered the sectional controversy that had been threatening the
existence of the Union with increasing intensity for several decades. As the nation’s politics
boiled with conflicts over the right (or not) of slaveholders to carry slaves into the nation’s
western territories, the Court confronted Harriet and Dred Scott’s legal claim that they had each
gained their freedom by their extended residence in free territory. Dred Scott had accompanied
his master to his military postings in Illinois and then in the Wisconsin Territory. In Wisconsin,
he met Harriet, also a slave who had accompanied her master to his military posting. With their
1

Thus, behaviorist political scientists, who have shown statistically that the Supreme Court makes
its decisions “politically,” have advanced understanding in only limited ways. The behaviorists have done
valuable work in lending a degree of rigor to any number of interesting questions about the Court. But on
the questions about whether Supreme Court decisions are governed by law or by the judges’ personal and
political “attitudes,” it seems to me that the behaviorists and their opponents do not actually disagree in
very important ways. It is a truism at this point that decisions of the Supreme Court, which exists largely
to take on the most controversial and legally indeterminate cases, are determined in many cases and in
significant part by some underlying values of the justices, though the behaviorists have valuably
quantified this point. But legal scholars insist that it is also true that the justices consult much more than
their own values; that the precise shape and outcome of judicial decisions also depends in significant
degree on the legal materials available and the imperatives of judicial method and legal argument. What
neither side has done particularly well is to attempt a sophisticated statement of how much politics there is
in this or that opinion and how much law. A new essay by Brian Tamanaha (forthcoming) reviews the
literature, raises this “how much” question, and debunks the myth that judges have widely bought into the
mechanical, formalistic models of their work. For prominent exponents of behaviorism, see Segal and
Spaeth (2002). Their critics include Michael Gerhardt (2003) and Mark Graber (forthcoming).
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masters’ permission, the two married before eventually returning to Missouri. Later suing for
their freedom in Missouri state court, the Scotts appeared to have an excellent chance of winning
under Missouri state law, since courts there had commonly accepted that a slaveholder’s
extended removal of a slave to a free state resulted in permanent emancipation, effective even in
Missouri by virtue of comity. But in the Scotts’ case, the state’s supreme court declined to
continue such extensions of comity amid Northern attacks on slavery. It held instead that the
Scotts remained in bondage. Rather than appeal the state court’s judgment to the federal
Supreme Court (since clear precedent effectively blocked that route), the Scotts tried launching a
new suit in federal court. The federal judge determined that the Scotts were eligible to sue in
federal court, because if free they would count as citizens of Missouri for purposes of Article III
of the Constitution; as citizens, they might use the federal forum to sue their owner, who was at
that time a citizen of a different state. Ultimately, though, the Scotts lost the federal action on the
merits in the trial court.
Appealing that loss to the Supreme Court, the Scotts presented, or at least opened the
door to, two issues: whether native-born Americans descended from African American slaves
could count as citizens under the Constitution; and whether the Missouri Compromise, which
had long formally barred slavery from a huge swath of territory, exceeded Congress’s authority.
It is worth remembering that this expansive territory from which slavery had ostensibly been
excluded, north and west of Missouri, had gotten little attention from American settlers before
the 1850s and had in fact harbored de facto slavery openly--witness the Scotts’ own experience
in Wisconsin (VanderVelde and Subramanian 1997, 1048-50). Thus, for all its alleged
sacredness as a Union-saving compromise, the Missouri Compromise had had little operative
consequence in the actual territory it purportedly governed. Moreover, once meaningful
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settlement was in the offing, the Missouri Compromise was repealed (in the Kansas-Nebraska
Act of 1854), and the formal right to carry slaves into this huge territory was restored over the
fervent opposition of much (but not nearly all) of the North. Shortly after this restoration, Chief
Justice Taney held in Scott2 both that native-born African Americans occupied so pervasively
subordinate a position in American society that practically none of them could ever
constitutionally count as citizens and that Congress had never had the power to exclude slavery
from the territory at issue. The territorial ruling, especially, appeared to large parts of the North
as an outrageous judicial manipulation of the Constitution.
The Court’s holdings were highly political both in the sense that they took sides on some
issues that were actively under debate in the political world and in the court-specific sense that
they rested on premises that no mechanical reasoning or neutral principles could simply confirm
or refute. Like every judicial opinion, Taney’s was constructed from a combination of closely
disciplined elements of legal reasoning and relatively undisciplined judgments about both factual
and legal questions for which the available materials offered no clear answers. When Taney
chose to defend and write into law some of the slaveholding states’ most controversial claims, he
earned himself the charge that he had dragged the Court down from its elevated station and
converted it into the merely political agent of the proslavery South. This charge was trumpeted
across the North by the Republicans of 1857 and again by a virtually complete scholarly
consensus at least since Don Fehrenbacher’s monumental 1978 monograph, The Dred Scott
2

From here on, I’ll refer to the case as Scott, rather than Dred Scott, both because the fate of the
entire Scott family--Harriet, Dred, and their daughters--was at issue and because Dred’s own facts were
probably not adequate to raise all the legal issues in the case; facts peculiar to members of his family were
necessary for that. In particular, Dred resided for a time in Illinois before going to the Wisconsin
Territory, thus arguably rendering his time in the area governed by the Missouri Compromise
superfluous: either he had already gained his freedom in Illinois or he was not going to gain it at all.
Harriet Scott, on the other hand, arguably could rely only on her residence in the Wisconsin Territory as
the basis for her claim to freedom, thus potentially raising the question of the constitutionality of the
Missouri Compromise. For other variations on this theme, see VanderVelde and Subramanian (1997).
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Case.
The modern condemnations rest on some premises that I share: that, political as judging
must often or always be, there is something distinctive and meaningful about the activities of
judges relative to those of legislators and executive officers3; and that a narrative of any
important episode in judicial history rightly embraces the question whether the judges’ actions
represented recognizably judicial action or, alternatively, encroachment on the authority of other
actors and institutions.
I propose that there is a workable standard, consistent with these premises, for
determining when judges have stepped outside the bounds of judicial action. This standard
probably renders Bush v. Gore (2000) and Marbury v. Madison (1803) largely outside those
bounds and, for example, Lochner v. New York (1905) and Scott (mostly) well within. I do not
think the standard I suggest will surprise anybody, but I do hope that the application of it in this
essay will contribute to a less political history of judicial politics. I suggest that it makes little
sense to deem judges excessively political when they resolve controversial cases by relying on
their personal judgments as to the meaning of indeterminate legal materials, however much one
may disagree with those judgments. It is fair enough to call that a political activity, but that is
what judges are generally required to do, so it can hardly be thought unjudicial. It does, however,
make sense to deem unjudicial--not just political but unjudicial--those judges who demonstrably
seize on a case for purposes other than the need to decide the case at hand or the need to provide
guidance for lower courts going forward. I think this standard does and should accommodate a
judge’s discretionary choice among available paths to get to a final judgment, even when that
choice seems driven by a silent ambition to influence policy beyond the case itself; the standard
3

I find the recent essay by Thomas Keck (2007) especially clear and useful. Also see Graber
(forthcoming).
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does not mandate minimalist judging. I also think the standard does and should accommodate
some measure of dictum, reasonably related to the well-considered issues in the case and meant
to guide lower courts in cases likely to emerge.4 But the standard would render unjudicial any
indulgence in dictum that is rendered with the evident ambition to influence or control public
deliberations rather than provide effective guidance for lower courts. The spirit of the judicial
role is that, whatever the particulars of the instant case, the greater goal is not the making of
policy but the perpetuation of the authority of law.
Finally, as a corollary to the above principles, it seems clear that the most unjudicial
conduct of a court lies in the deployment of a “legal” principle or argument for one case only,
with none of the discipline that comes from the knowledge that the reasoning must be adhered to
in other similar cases. Such judicial behavior is the ne plus ultra of the more common (but harder
to demonstrate) judicial practice of applying legal principles inconsistently from case to case.
Such behavior demonstrates the court’s determination simply to conclude a public question
rather than to implement and perpetuate the authority of law. To justify a final judgment by
reference to a “law” that the judge is not willing to treat as a law, applicable to more than one
specially selected case, has to be understood as the very worst kind of dictum; the judgment is an
ipse dixit and the opinion a mere polemic.
By my standards, then, it is usually futile to label an opinion political in the sense of
being illegitimate or unjudicial. Nonetheless, there are some clear examples in American judicial
history. For a simple but egregious example of dictum, consider Chief Justice John Marshall’s
use of the Marbury case in 1803 to lecture Madison and Jefferson on their executive obligations.
4

Some might insist that judges act illegitimately any time they say more than is necessary to
decide the case, but it seems obvious to me that courts often extend their opinions to guide lower courts
on questions clearly related to the one at hand and likely to arise in short order. That may seem a violation
of the judge’s formal role, but such pragmatic guidance hardly seems a usurpation in any meaningful
sense.
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The case famously raised the question whether the Supreme Court had the authority to order
President Jefferson or Secretary of State Madison to deliver some judicial commissions. The
commissions had been signed by the previous president but never delivered by the then-secretary
of state (who had been, of course, John Marshall himself). Since Marshall concluded that the
Court lacked that authority, it is very hard to see anything judicial in his extending the opinion to
argue that Jefferson and Madison nevertheless had an obligation to deliver the commissions.
Coming at a moment of extraordinary constitutional and political tension between Marshall’s
Federalist Party and Jefferson’s newly ascendant Republican Party, it constituted a bold
intervention in a public controversy without any accompanying prospect of guiding lower
courts,5 let alone explaining the judgment in the case (Ackerman 2005). In contrast, the opinion’s
controversial invalidation of a section of the Judiciary Act may have been political in the usual
sense and possibly even motivated by unjudicial purposes, but that holding and argument were
hardly unjudicial.6
Even worse, the per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore (2000), which I think is understood
to have been the work of Justice Kennedy, seems to me as unjudicial a Supreme Court opinion as
any I have encountered. That view rests not so much on the unlikelihood that Justice Kennedy
honestly favored some of the constitutional doctrines by which he justified his choosing of a
president, nor on the weakness of those arguments or on the necessarily political character of the
Court’s choice in taking a case that it had every right (but no obligation) to take. It rests instead
on Kennedy’s attempt to strip the opinion of all judicial character by prospectively confining it to
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In theory, Marbury might have been able to go to a lower federal court to seek mandamus, but I
have never seen anyone suggest that Marshall’s dictum was actually offered as guidance to lower courts
likely to encounter petitions for mandamus against the president and/or secretary of state.
6
See Bruce Ackerman (2005) for the latest scholarly word on Marshall and Marbury. Ackerman
paints Marshall--rightly, I think--as a profoundly political animal with few scruples about using his office
in unjudicial ways.
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its facts: “Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal
protection in election processes generally presents many complexities” (109).7 Of course, most
problems before the Supreme Court present many complexities, but that never leads the Court to
declare its reasoning unavailable as law for the future. In attempting to strip his own opinion of
all precedential value from the moment of its publication, he deprived it of the very thing that
might have made it judicial, even as every opinion in that case had some unavoidably political
character.8 In doing so, he was no longer deciding a judicial case, no longer seeking to vindicate
law so much as arrogating to the Court the authority to settle a public controversy.
The standard I am proposing accommodates the truth that all judging has some
unavoidably political components. It embraces as “judicial” the great majority of Supreme Court
opinions, from those that are driven almost mechanically by reference to precedent and/or
statutory language to those that rest on highly indeterminate legal sources, and so take on a more
overtly political character. At the same time, the standard reflects the American conviction that,
even in comparatively political cases, it is imperative that judicial politics remain judicial and
that judges limit themselves to deciding the cases in front of them and guiding lower courts.
Even though those functions must be understood realistically to leave the judges substantial
discretion to affect broader political debates, a careful adherence to the professional norms of

7

Whether this language actually is meant to eliminate the opinion’s precedential value has been a
matter of some debate not only among scholars but in a continuing way in the lower courts, all of which is
concisely summed up and the merits of the question evaluated by Chad Flanders (2007). The reasons why
Justice Kennedy would have so undermined his own opinion probably rest in the unlikelihood that he
would apply the Bush principles more broadly in election cases--perhaps also in the unlikelihood, as
Richard Pildes (2004, 48-49) points out, that they even could be applied without unmanageable
administrative expense.
8
It is true that other courts do related sorts of ad hoc justice all the time. See, for example, the
relatively informal justice that often gets dispensed by trial courts and by appeals courts that choose not to
publish many of their opinions. Perhaps that behavior is unjudicial, too, or perhaps not. But I think the
precise questions raised by those practices are meaningfully different from those raised by controversial
Supreme Court opinions.
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judging is assumed to be central to the preservation of law.
What of Scott, then, so often condemned as the ultimate in unjudicial judging? Can we
fairly say that the justices in the majority behaved as judges? Or, to the contrary, must we
conclude that they somehow sullied their offices more than all those other courts that joined in
the continuance of slavery before the Civil War? The judgment of recent decades has been
virtually unanimous that the Scott majority did obviously, flagrantly, and unforgivably depart
from its authorized role to pursue a proslavery agenda by whatever unscrupulous means it
thought might work. In particular, Don Fehrenbacher (1978) thought it important to devote
dozens of pages to establishing the claim that Taney’s opinion was a document of “unmitigated
partisanship” rather than a legitimately judicial opinion (3). And it is not hard to find scholars
who refer to the case almost reflexively as “transparently partisan” (Simon 2006, 125) or as the
“worst atrocity” in the history of the Court (Eisgruber 1993, 41).9

9

Here is some historiography of the Scott case: Since Fehrenbacher’s declaration that Taney’s
opinion amounted to pure partisanship, few have disagreed. I don’t mean here to discuss what I’ll call the
political historiography of the case, the writing that assesses the case’s impact on the popular politics of
the sectional crisis as of March, 1857. As far as possible, I mean to discuss only scholars’ conclusions as
to the causes of the Scott opinions and thus the case’s place (or not) in legal history; that is, whether Scott
is best understood, in its time, as a product of political undermining of the judicial process or, on the other
hand, a product of the judicial process itself, a reflection of the law’s preexisting principles and tendencies
as of 1857, given the preceding decades of judicial support for slaveholding rights under the Constitution.
Unfortunately, the years since Fehrenbacher’s 1978 opus saw little sustained historical writing on
this question until very recently. Scholarly reviews of Fehrenbacher at the time tended to be highly
supportive of his claims. Although Paul Finkelman offered some corrections on a few matters, he found
Fehrenbacher’s arguments, including his thrashing of Taney, almost “invariably sound” (Finkelman 1979,
374). Harold Hyman’s review devoted most of his energy to a celebration of Fehrenbacher’s
condemnation of Taney’s opinion, praising Fehrenbacher for shouldering the historian’s alleged
“responsibility to serve as a moral critic” (Hyman 1979, 439-441). And, in the Stanford Law Review,
Gary Simson offered some defenses of some of Taney’s reasoning but, at bottom, embraced
Fehrenbacher’s claim that Taney’s opinion was marked by “innumerable misrepresentations of law and
fact” (Simson 1980, 884).
More recent writing (Austin and Graber aside, of course) has tended in the same direction.
Christopher Eisgruber called the case the Court’s “worst atrocity” (Eisgruber 1993, 41). And Louise
Weinberg finished her argument for the historical importance of the case by declaring that “History has
not forgiven the Taney Court for Dred Scott, and it never should.” (Weinberg 2007, 139) Keith
Whittington has taken a more measured tone and criticized Taney less for any legal distortions than for

9

Quite a surprise, therefore, awaits when one goes back to the Taney and Curtis opinions

his ambition to settle a question better left to the politicians, but he also implicitly embraced the general
consensus about the opinion: “Dred Scott has been universally denounced as a terrible mistake by the
Court. Chief Justice Hughes [in 1928] labeled it a ‘self-inflicted wound’ and a ‘public calamity.’ Robert
McCloskey [in 1962] regarded it as ‘the most disastrous opinion the Supreme Court has ever issued.’
Alexander Bickel [in 1970] called it ‘a ghastly error,’ and his protege Robert Bork [in 1990] consider[ed]
it ‘the worst constitutional decision of the nineteenth century’” (Whittington 2001, 366). All of this
despite the fact that the weight of professional historical opinion discounts the impact of the case on the
coming of the war or even the election of Lincoln (Whittington 2001, 380, citing Fehrenbacher, Graber,
and Stampp).
Even historians who demonstrate a full understanding of the pervasive effects of slavery on
antebellum institutions find themselves suddenly jumping on the bandwagon when reading Taney’s
opinion. Thus Hyman and Wiecek produced an accomplished constitutional history of Jacksonian
America, often revealing the profound influence of slavery on the Constitution and its history, only to
deem Taney’s opinion specially indefensible (Hyman and Wiecek 1982, 180-89). To me, these authors
could more naturally have read Taney’s opinion as the climax of long-standing legal and constitutional
tendencies in the Jacksonian and antebellum years, not as a special corruption of the law. Like Hyman
and Wiecek, Michael Zuckert explains how deeply slavery infected the Constitution and its history and
constrained what judges could do, but he too concludes that “we must judge” the majority justices for
taking “the least defensible” course (Zuckert 2007, 328). Similarly, James Simon’s recent treatment of
Taney and Lincoln offers a remarkably fair portrait of Taney as a powerful legal mind and a consistent
thinker, trapped in the dilemmas of slave society, only to suddenly condemn his Scott opinion as
“transparently partisan” (Simon 2006, 125). Earl Maltz’s recent book on Scott similarly manages to
deliver very fair mini-biographies of the Justices that ventilate the Southern constitutional perspective
only to conclude with a condemnation of Taney for his “judicial hubris” and his “fundamental
misunderstanding of the appropriate role of the Supreme Court in the American political system” (Maltz,
2007a, 156). As the main text will show, it’s not that I disagree that there was an element of judicial
hubris in Taney’s opinion, but I think these accusations ignore the much greater defects in Curtis’s
opinion.
Until recently, I had classed Paul Finkelman with this last group, because his teaching book on
Scott leaves the usual impression that there is nothing good to be said about Taney’s performance as a
judge in that case (Finkelman 1997). But he has recently been dropping hints that Taney may have
decided the case in a legally correct—or at least defensible—manner, given the nature of the original
Constitution and the slaveholding society it served (Finkelman 2007, 4-5). Sanford Levinson evinced a
similar ambivalence, perhaps, when in a single article he referred to Taney’s “egregious opinion” in Scott
but then raised the question—without answering it--whether Taney might actually have been “right.”
Given “the basic decision in 1787 to enter a union with slaveholders” and to bear the “consequences for
every aspect of American constitutional doctrine,” he suggests the plausibility of the claim that racism
was then “a fundamental value” (Levinson 1993, 1089, 1092, 1104-1108). Another example of openness
to the possible rightness of Taney’s opinion, though a somewhat odd one, appears in Bruce Ackerman’s
We the People (1991). Ackerman did not develop this point about Scott, only tossing out the suggestion
that Scott might have been rightly decided in its time, because he wanted to make a larger point about the
need to revisit the Lochner case and an even larger point about long term constitutional transformations.
In any case, I think scholars of Scott should take to heart what Ackerman said about Lochner, which I
adapt here for Scott: “We can begin to look upon the [southern-leaning] judges as judges, not pariahs,
whose decisions differ from modern case law largely because the Constitution they were interpreting was
importantly different from the transformed Constitution left to us by the [Reconstruction Amendments]”
(Ackerman 1991, 66).
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to evaluate them carefully, especially in light of recent scholarship by historians, political
scientists, and legal scholars. Resting on a general recognition that racism and slavery were the
order of that historical day (Levinson 1993), these recent works range from aggressively
revisionist accounts of Scott by Mark Graber and Austin Allen to much broader-gauged forays
into the socioconstitutional history of slavery like those of William Freehling (2007; 1990), Lacy
Ford (2008), John Craig Hammond (2007), David Lightner (2006), Earl Maltz (2007a), Matthew
Mason (2006), James Simon (2006), Eva Wolf (2006), Michael Zuckert (2007), and others. Part
I of this essay, then, will synthesize this body of recent writing to redraw the big picture of
Scott’s place in legal-historical scholarship--to reconstitute the constitutional history of Scott. All
the works I draw on help to reopen a window on Scott as something other than a usurpation by
partisan judges.
Graber’s Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil (2006), in particular, is a tour
de force in its vindication of the insights of the constitutional politics school of political science.
His book does miss the mark with respect to its grander claims about “constitutional evil,” and,
for my purposes, it pays too little attention to the principal opinions themselves. Graber
decisively debunks many of the careless condemnations of Taney and the reflexive praise for
Curtis that predominates in the literature. But he does not go far enough for a legal scholar or a
legal historian in explicating why Taney and Curtis wrote as they did and whether either or both
of them truly abandoned the judicial role to exploit their positions for unjudicial purposes. Still,
Graber’s work and a wave of recent historical literature give us the necessary preconditions for
rereading the Scott opinions. This larger body of scholarship can be read to deepen the targeted
revisionism of Graber and of the somewhat less successful, though still valuable, Allen book
(2006). This broader literature elucidates the degree to which racism and slavery clung not just to

11

specific clauses of the Constitution but to the Constitution’s divergent social and political
histories in the North and South. These works broaden and clarify the context within which Scott
must be understood, restore real interest in the case as an important artifact of legal as well as
political history, and fruitfully reopen the perennial puzzle of the law-politics relationship.
Part II of this essay builds on this historiographical foundation to do a detailed
reexamination of both Taney’s majority opinion in Scott and Curtis’s dissent. Taney’s opinion
has been so thoroughly reviled and Curtis’s dissent so honored, almost hallowed,10 that they have
become shorthand for judicial decadence, on the one hand, and judicial probity, on the other. It
may come as a great shock, then, to discover that Curtis’s opinion turns out not just to be
political--as the constitutional politics school reminds us every opinion is--but to verge on the
unjudicial. Close attention to the precise arguments made by Curtis--especially his attempt to
undermine the authority of the Missouri Supreme Court--reveals a judge who perhaps no longer
cared to be bound by the rules of judicial argument. As for Taney, his opinion, too, was
unavoidably political, but in only one brief instance can I see that he crossed the line to
unjudicial behavior, whereas some of his most widely condemned claims--especially his
argument for a due process right to bring slaves to the territories--turn out to be far more
sophisticated and far more judicial than his critics have recognized. A close examination of the
opinions11 in this famously political case will help us see why they were written as they were and
where legitimately judicial politics ends and unjudicial usurpation begins.
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Most recently, see Maltz (2007b, 265, note 1).
Space precludes analyzing all of the Scott opinions, so I have chosen only Taney’s and Curtis’s,
the ones I take to be the most important. Justice McLean’s anti-Southern opinion has perhaps been even
more celebrated than Curtis’s for its firmer antislavery tone, but it has also been widely thought much
more political and much less accomplished as a legal rejoinder to Taney and the others in the majority
(Maltz 2007a, 129-39).
11
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I. THE EMERGING HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SLAVERY AND THE CONSTITUTION:
FROM THE PHILADELPHIA CONVENTION TO SCOTT
Graber and Scott Revisionism
Over the last few years, a fresh body of historical writing has addressed the development
of the Constitution and slavery between 1787 and the Civil War. The most starkly revisionist of
these writings are Mark Graber’s Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil and Austin
Allen’s Origins of the Dred Scott Case, both published in 2006. Each of these reframes familiar
events in stimulating ways, but Graber’s is the more successful historical work and should be the
foundation of Scott studies for the foreseeable future.
To understand Graber’s contribution, it is valuable to start with a brief appreciation and
critique of the doctrine-centered account of his co-revisionist, Allen. Allen argues that the
sectional crisis that supposedly preoccupied the nation in the 1850s was actually just one of two
main sources of the Court’s decision. The origins of the Dred Scott case, for Allen, lay just as
much in Jacksonian jurisprudence, a collection of doctrinal tensions that had developed through
two decades of Taney Court decisions. The relevant Jacksonian jurisprudence comprised not just
the Court’s slave cases but equally its sometimes chaotic cases on diversity jurisdiction, the
commerce clause, the contracts clause, state police powers, and other cases touching the
relationship between the national and state governments.
The problem is that, although Allen’s book offers a number of important insights, it does
not, in the end, adequately connect its problematic version of Jacksonian jurisprudence to the
Scott opinions as written. Allen offers little evidence that the justices actually saw the
connections among the several categories of cases that he discusses. One just cannot tell from the
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evidence presented whether the justices were thinking about slavery when discussing, for
example, the constitutionality of state liquor regulation, or corporate citizenship in diversity
cases, or federal exclusivity under the commerce clause.
Moreover, when coming to Scott, Allen slips into some excessive claims. It is hard to
credit his suggestion that Scott can be explained, even in part, by the justices’ supposed
professional obligation to resolve all outstanding doctrinal tensions in the case law, heedless of
the real world implications of such a course. He verges on claiming that the Scott majority
worried only about doctrinal messiness and not about the precise state of the sectional crisis in
1857. Quoting David Potter’s suggestion that, as intense as the political crisis was, it did not
constantly distract people from their personal and professional affairs, he then argues that that
observation “may apply to the Taney Court as well” (Allen 2006, 136). He explains, “By 1857,
internal debates taking place among the justices had effectively boxed in the court to such an
extent that its rulings in Dred Scott appeared both unavoidable and absolutely necessary” (136).
By this, Allen refers not just to debates in the slavery cases but to doctrinal difficulties in a wide
range of cases that “had simply destroyed any possible mechanism the court could have had to
evade the case’s controversial aspects” (136). Especially, he suggests that the continuing
dissatisfaction of a three-justice minority on the question of corporate citizenship in diversity
cases somehow created the necessity that the majority “break” that minority’s “challenge” (136).
Nothing adequately addresses the simple argument that the justices actually were national
politicians in a very important sense, not just average people going about their affairs, and that
the justices could indeed have avoided many of the controversial questions in the case with little
doctrinal sweat. That is, Allen has not adequately incorporated a basic insight of the
constitutional politics school.
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Still, Allen’s close readings of the Scott opinions provide a number of valuable
correctives to the current orthodoxy. Allen is especially strong in his evaluation of Taney and
Curtis on the question of the Scotts’ citizenship and thus their eligibility to sue in federal court.
To read Allen’s book, then, is to be reminded that an internal doctrinal history is bound to
be too limited. The Scott case was, of course, deeply political. But that does not mean that the
Scott majority was a partisan caucus. The core function of the Court--its paradigmatically
judicial function--is to decide cases and to perpetuate the authority of law, not to set policy or
dictate to the other branches. At the same time, of course, all commentators recognize that
judicial decision making in a case like Scott is a mix of law and politics. In this context, the key
question to ask is whether there was something about the judges’ inescapably political judgments
that rendered the majority’s action unjudicial, a mere partisan polemic.
If an internal doctrinal history can never be enough to account for a case like Scott, then
what is needed is something more like the approach of the constitutional politics scholars, among
whom Mark Graber is a major figure. Like Allen, Graber seeks to rehabilitate the Scott Court,
but his 2006 book takes a very different route. Although he has plenty to say about doctrine, he is
more concerned with situating the Court in the larger politics of the Constitution. This approach
has been employed by a number of political scientists, historians, and legal scholars in recent
years to show that an effective understanding of American constitutionalism must fully
appreciate the courts’ complicated interactions with political institutions of all kinds (Fisher and
Devins 1992; Whittington 2007, 1999; Leonard 2002, 2001; Kramer 2004). These institutions
might include branches and agencies of government, political parties, unions, business
organizations, special interests of various kinds, as well as popular movements and the electorate
as such. Writers in this area identify significantly political aspects of the courts and substantial
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influence running from the so-called political branches to the courts. But they also see
meaningful legal limits on what courts do, influence running back from the courts to the political
branches, and great salience for legalistic and constitutional thinking on important political
questions even outside the courts. Graber approaches Scott, then, as a problem in the
development of a broad constitutional politics after 1787. There is little determinate in the
specifically judicial doctrine that constitutional politics generates. In Graber’s account, Taney’s
and Curtis’s doctrinal efforts in Scott appear about equally judicial because they are about
equally well grounded in the necessarily political development of the Constitution.
For Graber, once one understands constitutional law’s indeterminate and pragmatic
qualities and thus its persistent dependence on a more general constitutional politics, Scott
becomes just a dramatic example of the typical processes of constitutional adjudication. The
Constitution that the Court routinely confronts does not represent a fixed, substantive principle
(e.g., liberty) but a mechanism for compromising even the most deeply held principles of a
pluralist society. The Court thus resolves cases under the authority of both the indeterminate
constitutional text that anchors society’s most important settlements and the imperatives of
constitutional politics that adjust those settlements through time. Nothing unjudicial about that,
he suggests. These decisions, of course, have political qualities, but they have legal qualities too.
And it is these recognizably legal qualities that entitle them to a kind of authority, a judicial
authority, that plays a special role in tempering conflicts among groups that hold incompatible
values (slaveholders and Free-Soilers then, pro-choice and pro-life activists now, for example).
Thanks to the judiciary as such, American history is marked more by repeated peaceful
submission to the latest evolution of the constitutional settlement and less by secession, civil
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violence, or even crude majoritarianism. 12
Of course, Scott conspicuously failed to have this pacifying effect, and perhaps Graber’s
chief objective is to show why it might have been best for all concerned to bow to its authority
rather than resorting to violence. Thus, Graber (2006) moves beyond his impressive
rehistoricization of Scott to attempt an even grander point about “constitutional evil.” He
suggests that Taney’s opinion might actually have been the right decision--not so much
doctrinally as politically. That is, Taney might have been right to suppose that, however evil
slavery was, the practical price of attempting to eliminate it through federal action--in dead
soldiers and any number of other consequences of a civil war that might have entrenched rather
than eliminated slavery--was even greater. Or, as Graber writes on the final pages of the book, it
might have been better to vote for the “peace” candidate John Bell in 1860 rather than for the
champion of “justice,” as Graber imagines Lincoln, because, as a general matter, “just causes are
better realized by persuasion than by force” (253).
The logic of the argument is that constitutions exist to create political structures and
dynamics by which society’s inevitable “evils” are rendered sufficiently tolerable that political
disagreement does not constantly devolve into violence. On one level, nothing could be more
obvious: a constitution, written or otherwise, substitutes a widely embraced structure of politics
and law for the violence that would otherwise settle large-scale disagreements. On another level,
it is empty: this truism about constitutions tells us nothing about whether any particular “evil” or,
more usefully, any particular clash of values, represents the sort of disagreement that politics and
law can rightly compromise and resolve, or, alternatively, the rare kind that is worth fighting and
12

Cf. Leonard (2007) which analyzes Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s account of criminal law and explicates
that Civil War veteran’s view of law as profoundly political and partial, yet profoundly necessary to
preserve “civilization” (i.e., peace) as against the violence pregnant in more overtly political modes of
policymaking.
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dying over. Had Graber taken on the daunting challenge of proving empirically that the
continued accommodation of slavery would have been somehow better than the stout resistance
that finally contributed to the horrific Civil War, then his meditations on “constitutional evil”
would have been more compelling. As is, they only muddy his achievement--to which I now
return--in developing a brilliant history of constitutional politics that might rehabilitate the
reviled Taney.

The Constitutional Politics of Slavery, 1787-1857
Beyond Graber’s pointed Scott revisionism, there lies a valuable collection of recent
studies of the politico-constitutional status of slavery between 1787 and 1861. These histories
make clear how completely the celebrated Constitution incorporated a commitment to slavery,
both in 1787 and more importantly in its evolution across succeeding decades. Together with
Graber, they point to a new and genuinely historical accounting of Scott.
One implication of this work is that, as Graber argues, the Founders simply had no
clearly agreed settlement in mind for most of the particular questions that would come up in
Scott. The goals of the Constitution had much more to do with setting up governmental
institutions and a political process than with establishing precise, substantive rules of
constitutional law. The Constitution offered a foundation for an ongoing constitutional politics, a
document of frequently indeterminate rules that would have to be refined through practice. And
it would not take long for politicians to establish the predominance of evolving practice in
establishing the meaning of the Constitution.13
13

This point is well established by David Currie’s (2005) nearly comprehensive treatment of the
period’s constitutional debates in his Constitution in Congress series. Although Currie asserts that
everyone at the time was an “originalist,” in fact practically all his evidence demonstrates
contemporaries’ belief that it was evolving practice that most often fixed constitutional meaning.
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The initial, rough understanding on the question of slavery in 1787, according to Graber,
was simply that the institution would never be abolished without the consent of the slaveholding
states. Although he offers little direct evidence of such an agreement, it is uncontroversial to note
that the Constitution accommodated slavery in a number of ways, the fugitive slave and threefifths clauses being the most obvious and decisive, and that only the most marginal figures in
American public life ever thought that the national government was empowered to abolish
slavery in the states. Lacy Ford (2008) argues similarly that difficult negotiations in Philadelphia
on particular issues like the international slave trade rested on an “unwritten constitutional
understanding” (98). That understanding comprised both Southern agreement that slavery was a
“problem”--an unfortunate institution that the South must eventually leave behind--and Northern
agreement “to allow the political leaders of the states most involved with slavery to guide its
future course” (98). This understanding that the South would find a way to emancipate itself
from slavery rested on pure hope and crossed fingers, since no one had a realistic plan for ending
slavery. Still, such an agreement might reasonably inform the constitutional interpretations made
by subsequent actors, judicial or otherwise, in particular cases like Scott, even as it could hardly
provide clear, mechanical answers. Only subsequent constitutional history, in and out of court,
could provide real resolution.
For these and other reasons, then, it seems clear that more than one interpretation of the
constitutional settlement might prove plausible. It was fair for some to characterize the
Constitution as a guarantee to the slave states that slavery would remain their problem, never a
liability for them in national politics. As suggested above, though, it was also widely imagined at
the Founding that slavery might wither away on its own. Thus the Constitution’s arguably
reluctant accommodations of the institution did not necessarily mean that the national
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government could not move against slavery in any way. Many in 1787 might have anticipated
the achievement of an emancipated future partly though national authority to limit slavery’s
geographic reach so as to encourage its withering. But any such hopeful types would also have
had to reckon with the clear probability that slavery would expand in the near term and even that
such expansion would be demanded as a matter of right (Hammond 2007). At the Convention,
George Mason recognized that, “The Western people are already calling out for slaves for their
new lands,” thus making slave expansion inevitable, in his eyes, if the international slave trade
were not promptly closed (Ford 2008, 98). The conflicts in Scott were well foreshadowed by the
facts already on the ground in 1787 or shortly thereafter, and it seems impossible to say that the
writers and ratifiers of the Constitution came to any clear agreement about how that conflict
should be resolved.
Moreover, it was not only the South that was involved in entrenching slavery in the face
of wishful emancipationist rhetoric. Already in 1787 and increasingly in the nineteenth century,
Southern slavery was deeply interwoven with the economies and thus the collective lives of
many communities outside the South and the national community itself. These communities
were already on a capitalist trajectory that, as it happened, rested on Southern slavery. As Adam
Rothman (2005) writes, “Forced labor did not merely precede transnational capitalist networks
of commodity exchange. It was also enmeshed in those networks as they proliferated around the
world in the nineteenth century” (223). Slavery was not just recognized in the Constitution and
practiced in the South, but its effects pervaded the society for which that Constitution was made.
Thus, whatever constitutional material an opponent of slavery might have cited to justify
limitations on the institution, any realistic observer had to anticipate an indefinite future for
slavery both on the ground and in the Constitution.
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The point, then, is that a diversity of Founding-era views hovered about the
Constitution’s slave texts, including some strongly grounded views that the slave states would
retain control over slavery’s destiny. As Graber argues, that generation certainly did not
contemplate the precise facts that emerged by the end of the War of 1812 and that would
condition American politics all the way to the Civil War: a majority North threatening a firmly
proslavery South with abolition and political oblivion (Graber 2006, 91-114; Mason 2006, 2831). And fantasies of a peaceful path to a slave-free society never really stood up to the reality
that the world’s only popular government would for the foreseeable future remain a
“slaveholding republic” (Fehrenbacher and McAfee 2001).
This general picture is not really much different in the end from Fehrenbacher’s 1978
sketch of the Founding. His Scott tome drew out the Constitution’s ambiguities, its obfuscations,
and the inadequate attention paid to the problem of slavery by the Framers. And he developed
the critical importance of post-Founding history for giving real meaning to the incomplete
settlement of 1787-1789 (Fehrenbacher 1978, chapters 1 and 2; Fehrenbacher and McAfee
2001). Others do the same. David Lightner (2006), for example, offers some reinforcement for
this general position in his argument that the Founders never confronted the question of whether
the commerce clause might give Congress power to abolish or hinder the interstate slave trade
(chapter 2). In fact, that question was never really resolved but remained a constitutional issue
negotiated in court and in the political arena for the rest of the antebellum years (Lightner 2006).
In Graber’s summation, then, the years after 1787 brought a growing recognition of the
slave states’ right to a kind of sectional equality in the Union, an equality that implied firm
protection for slavery against any national effort to abolish the institution, even as the dream of
gradual withering persisted with equal strength. Any number of recent works on the period agree
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that the ambiguities of 1787 persisted for a good while. A relatively fluid set of regional and
sectional alignments only yielded a strong North-South sectionalism after a generation of
slavery’s expansion through the southwest, the War of 1812, and especially in the course of the
Missouri crisis of 1819-1821 (Onuf 1983; Rothman 2005; Lightner 2006; Mason 2006;
Hammond 2007).14 The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, enacted under the Articles of
Confederation and reaffirmed early in the new Congress, barred slavery from a huge territory
with broad Southern support. This Southern acceptance of a federal limitation on slavery’s
expansion reflected, in part, the slave states’ self-interest in preventing the northwest from
competing in the production of staple crops and, in part, the separate desire to support expansion
of the republic (Onuf 1983, 169-71; Freehling 1990, 138). Of course, such expansionism soon
produced the Southwest Ordinance of 1790, which contemplated a vast territory open to slavery.
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 reaffirmed slaveholders’ rights to their human property, and the
Louisiana Purchase of 1803 added more slave territory. On the other hand, the international slave
trade was abolished at the first opportunity, although again with substantial Southern support, not
against Southern resistance. Then the Missouri controversy of 1819-1821 unleashed a far more
aggressively antislavery North than had previously revealed itself. At the same time, a number of
Southerners, including James Madison himself, now denied that the Constitution authorized
Congress to close any of the nation’s territories to slaveholding, despite the precedent of the
Northwest Ordinance (Hammond 2007, chs. 4, 8; Mason 2006, 197-204; Fehrenbacher 1978,
110).
In Graber’s account, approval of the Missouri Compromise became possible only when
enough Southerners decided to “waive” their claimed constitutional right of equal access to all
14

And even then it is clear that other regional and sectional rivalries were as important as the one
between the slave states and the free for some years to come. See Daniel Feller (1984) on the public
lands in the 1820s and 1830s, and James Roger Sharp (1970) on the banking question in the 1830s.
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territories in return for the admission of Missouri and an implicit recognition of Southern
equality (Graber 2006, 125). Moreover, John Craig Hammond (2007) argues that the Southern
readiness to waive this “right” was motivated in part by a conviction that the ban on slaveholders
would never actually be enforced--that when the territories were actually settled and readied for
organization, the status of slavery in those areas would be addressed afresh. Of course, this
prediction was fully borne out by the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the 1854 congressional repeal of the
ban on slavery in these territories (161-68). Thus, only through the rocky enactment of the
Missouri Compromise did it become clear that there existed a North and a South in a durable
competition; that this competition had turned to the South’s disadvantage with the permanent,
unexpected shift of population dominance northward; but that the South was ready to insist that
the spare language of the Constitution must imply a permanent guarantee of the constitutional
equality of slaveholders’ rights in the nation’s territories.
The North as a whole would never embrace this Southern principle. Harboring some
strong Southern sympathizers, it mostly nurtured various theories of how the Constitution might
allow the North to keep slavery at arm’s length, perhaps leading ultimately to abolition but
mainly preserving the North’s right to pursue its own interests without having to confront the
despised and feared institution too directly. For the next forty years, the nation’s constitutional
politics constantly readjusted the compromise between Southern demands for sectional equality
and Northern insistence that the Constitution did not require it to accommodate slaveholders at
every turn. Recognizing its firm status as the minority section of the Union after 1820, the South
began to insist on institutional mechanisms to preserve slave-state equality. Anything less would
fatally impair the essential property rights of citizens of the slave states and the fundamentals of
those states’ social, economic, and political structures. In 1787, the three-fifths clause and
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perhaps the fugitive slave clause had seemed adequate to the job. Even with the Northwest
Ordinance standing as a conspicuous exception, Southerners constructed a narrative of
slaveholders’ “rights” out of the reality of slavery’s persistent expansion from the Founding
through the Missouri crisis (Hammond 2007). But now protection of such rights seemed to
require new mechanisms, such as equality of representation in the Senate. Many Southerners
denied that slavery could be excluded from the territories, but, failing Northern acceptance of
that principle, at least they insisted that new states enter the Union in pairs. The South would
thereby retain half the Senate seats and veto power over any serious legislative incursion on
Southern rights (Graber 2006, 137-53).
In just a few years’ time, however, protection for the South would come to depend less on
this balance rule and more on the emergence of national party organizations. When the national
Democratic Party emerged in the 1830s as a permanent institution, it evinced a commitment in
all regions of the country to the protection of Southern slavery, including some ill-defined scope
for geographical expansion. The South had gained what would be its most important weapon
right through the 1850s, and that was only sharpened in combat with the Whig Party, which itself
defended slavery as often as it attacked it (144-48).
Through the early 1850s, the constitutional politics of slavery largely vindicated Southern
principles--but never comfortably. For example, starting in the 1830s, the House of
Representatives for years maintained a gag rule that prevented acknowledgement of even the
existence of antislavery petitions addressed to the House, lest the least respect be paid to the
enemies of the South’s essential institution. While that policy provoked some heated opposition,
the real test of Southern power came in the 1840s as sentiment for territorial expansion heated
up. The Democratic Party was then compelled to consider the precise scope of its commitment to
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Southern rights as it contemplated the seizure from Mexico of Texas, California, and most of the
land in between. The necessity of executing a slavery policy in these territories brought out
sectional stresses in both parties, but especially the dominant Democrats. David Wilmot and
other Northern Democrats in the House had already detected a growing, pro-Southern imbalance
of power in the party, beginning at least as early as the South’s refusal to permit renomination of
former president Martin Van Buren in 1844. Faced with the concrete problem of governing new
territories, Wilmot introduced his famous 1846 Proviso, which would have banned slavery from
any territory acquired in the Mexican War (Freehling 1990, 458-59).
This challenge to the South opened intermittent sectional wars within the parties that
would last until secession itself. But throughout those years, the main force that delayed
secession was the persistence of the Democratic Party as a nationalizing force. In territorial crisis
after territorial crisis, that party managed to satisfy its sectional wings just well enough to hold
together. By the early 1850s, the Whigs were moribund, but the Democrats had managed to
survive the Compromise of 1850, which formally opened the new territories of the Mexican
Cession to slavery, and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in the Kansas-Nebraska Act of
1854. All of this history uneasily protected the South from serious inroads on slavery. As
importantly, it preserved the South’s belief that, though it had become the minority section, it
retained such constitutional status and leverage that it could continue to defend its equal “rights”
even if abolitionism seemed always at the doorstep (Graber 2006, 148-59; Holt 1978; Leonard
2002, 252-66).

Slave Society and the Constitution
As is generally the case with work in the “constitutional politics” school, the preceding
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account of constitutional development goes beyond the courts to the political arena, but only
gestures at the social history that must underlie any political history of the Constitution. The
sources of constitutional meaning and doctrine, however, are even broader and deeper than a
short political history of the period, including this one, can demonstrate. But a look at the
insightful work of William Freehling and others on the development of Southern principles helps
explain not only the political but the social underpinnings of constitutional development.
Freehling’s new volume (2007) of his Road to Disunion joins his first volume (1990) in
ruthlessly uncovering the social pathologies of a “democratic” slaveholding society, connecting
those pathologies to sectional politics, and using that context to illuminate the nature of the Scott
majority. Other recent writing, too, sustains Freehling’s perspective and provides the critical
reader with further reason to question the picture of Taney as the leader of a partisan caucus.
In Freehling’s account, the fundamental and active humanity of the enslaved is so
objectively inconsistent with their status as property as to undermine their masters’ declared
commitment to democracy. This unsurprising point, though, must be connected to the equally
true point that Southern slaveholders and nonslaveholders alike honestly venerated notions of
political equality and civil liberty and believed them applicable to a much larger swath of the
population--the nonenslaved white men--than practically any society before. The ambition both
to sustain a genuinely democratic society among white men and to deny even the first hints of
liberty and democracy to a large part of the total population may have seemed achievable in the
abstract, but in practice, of course, it proved impossible. That was because the enslavement of
humans, unlike the ownership of all sorts of other chattels, created the ever-present threat of
bloody insurrection and a consequent web of suspicion and duplicity.
There was the ever-present reality of duplicity on the part of the not-yet-revolting slaves,
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a duplicity that the slaveholders alternately denied and feared. There was the self-deception on
the part of the “democratic” and ostensibly benevolent owners, who actually and necessarily
focused much of their energy on sustaining systems of coercion. There was the suspicion among
the slaveholders that their nonslaveholding neighbors did not fully endorse their property rights
in human beings and would not maintain the society-wide discipline necessary to prevent
insurrection. Finally, even slaveholders themselves often harbored doubts about the justifiability
of an institution that they relied on and profited from but also feared, with no clear way of
shedding the institution (so they universally insisted) and no comfortable way of holding on to it.
Nearly always, the profitability of slavery overcame both their moral scruples and the
widespread anxiety that followed each of the many insurrections that actually occurred. But
those uprisings lay on a continuum with the daily evidence of the duplicity at the foundation of
the slaveholding republics. Together, they stoked the fear that antislavery sentiment among
whites would slip out, become uncontained, make its way to the always revolt-ready enslaved,
and open the door to the insurrection that all expected (Freehling 2007, 1994; Ford 2008).
If all this were not enough, Northern pressure intensified Southern combustibility. Thus,
even if (as was the case) some Southerners were prepared to discuss ways to ameliorate the
institution and inch toward abolition, the presence of an antislavery majority (or even minority)
in the North got in the way. Lacy Ford (2008) offers the example of William Cabell Rives, who
carried the tradition of earnest but futile regret about slavery far into the age of Southern-rights
extremism: “As late as 1857, Rives believed that slavery would gradually disappear ‘under the
influence of a humane and enlightened public opinion’ in the South if, and only if, ‘national
agitation’ of the issue ‘could be made to cease’” (121). The antislavery Northerners in the
imagination of the South were not just the small minority of avowed “abolitionists.” They
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included as well the large numbers that seemed merely to tolerate slavery in the Union rather
than embracing slaveholding rights as the equal of all other property rights. Exhibit A on this
score was the Wilmot Proviso of 1846. As noted above, this proposal would have barred slavery
from the Mexican Cession and seemed to threaten a permanent end to the expansion of the
South’s essential institution. Critically, the Proviso was introduced not by declared abolitionists
but by Democratic regulars, the indispensable bulwark of Southern rights in the North15
(Freehling 1990, 458-62; Maltz 2007a, 42-45, 81-82; Leonard 2002, 253-54).
Southern Democrats reacted with stunned surprise when their Northern brothers thus
declared Southern inferiority. As Earl Maltz (2007a) reports, the Van Burenite regular Democrat
Peter Daniel, who would become the most extreme Southerner on the Scott Court, appeared a
moderate and trusting voice until the Wilmot Proviso, which, he wrote to Van Buren, “declares
to me that I am not regarded as an equal” (82). Similarly, Alabama’s John Archibald Campbell, a
highly regarded lawyer writing years before his nomination to the Court, articulated the Southern
conviction that “slavery is the central point about which Southern society is formed. It was so
understood at the formation of the Constitution…. We must have an organization of the territory
that admits us as equals” (84). The same story can be told of Chief Justice Taney. As James
Simon (2006) argues, Taney held pretty consistent views of slavery. As firmly racist as most of
his contemporaries, he nevertheless detested slavery and emancipated and supported the slaves
he had inherited. He defended the rights of antislavery speakers--as long as the speaker stopped
short of “disturb[ing] the peace and order of society” (11)--in his courtroom defense of an
antislavery minister in 1819. A few years later, as attorney general, he argued with perfect
15

Imagine as well the Southern Democratic horror when Martin Van Buren himself, the man who
practically invented transsectional Democratic organization with no moral qualms about slavery, bolted
the party and accepted the “abolitionist” Free Soil nomination in 1848. He did so not because he had any
sympathy for abolitionists, but as a way of resisting Southern engrossment of power within the
Democratic Party (Maltz 2007a; Freehling 1990; Leonard 2002).
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consistency that African Americans were nevertheless ineligible for citizenship. His all too
common racism well accommodated both the wrongness of slavery and a refusal to see African
Americans as members of Taney’s own constitutional family. Widely praised as one of the great
chief justices for his work before Scott, Taney in the 1840s took a constitutional position that
was fully consistent with his long held beliefs. He
bristled at the condescending attitude of northern politicians toward the South and their
assumption that they were morally superior to southerners. And he was steadfast in his
belief that the framers had made a binding constitutional pact between the North and
South that entitled the states to determine for themselves whether slavery would live or
die. (94-95)
Notwithstanding the crucial importance of the Wilmot Proviso in giving new salience to
sectional tensions generally, none of the main Southern arguments and sentiment of the 1840s
was fundamentally new. John Craig Hammond (2007) makes clear that all the central arguments
were already in place in many Southern minds by the time of the Missouri Compromise in 1820:
that the Constitution explicitly recognized property rights in slaves, that slavery could not be
prohibited anywhere except by the consent of the affected political community, that the
Northwest Ordinance was a usurpation, that slaveholding was a “right” everywhere in the United
States but where a full-fledged state government had prohibited it, and that therefore the
Missouri Compromise could never be enforced (161-68). Similarly, Matthew Mason (2006)
develops the evidence that even before the Missouri crisis, Southern society lived with a constant
and well-founded fear of insurrection just below the surface of daily life, a fear that underlay the
Southern readiness to treat every Northern move to restrict slaveholding as an invitation to
insurrection and as an unconstitutional step in the direction of “universal emancipation” (also see
Ford 2008; Wolf 2006).
Thus did Northerners persistently provoke Southern intransigence on slavery questions
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simply by insisting on what they thought was a fair territorial policy, especially in light of the
manifest immorality of slavery. Thus did Southerners--even those who shared something of that
opposition to slavery in the abstract--recoil at the North’s persistent intimations of Southern
inferiority as long as slavery survived. More than this, Northerners inspired a constant ratcheting
up of political orthodoxy inside the South, gradually increasing the number of Southerners who
felt compelled to defend slavery as a positive good. As the Democratic and Whig Parties
competed with each other to prove their reliability on slavery, public discourse suggested that
anything less than a full bore defense of slavery might be a step toward the entire society’s
suicide.
The result was a society of boiling internal contradictions that increasingly suppressed
free speech in the name of democracy. In the Southern mind, slavery grew more and more
fundamental to southern civilization. Increasingly, a controlling culture emerged that ruled out
public talk of abolition and demanded close scrutiny of every national measure that might touch
slavery. To allow free speech on the subject of abolition was ostensibly to risk the selfimmolation of Southern society. To allow the national government to relegate one set of states to
inequality violated basic principles of democracy.
All of this internal tension was intensified even further by the condition of the border
states. Here, Freehling (2007) tells us, slavery seemed always on the verge of disintegration
through some combination of runaways to an intrusive North, emancipations, domestic political
challenge by the large nonslaveholding majority, and the steady selling of slaves southward. All
of this created the prospect that slavery would become ever more narrowly isolated in a small
minority of states and thus increasingly at the mercy of the antislavery majority in the nation. In
this condition, each instance of condemnation and condescension from the North provoked
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another episode in “a touchy civilization’s enraged spree of self-justification” (17).
It is essential to recognize that Southern society was, of course, not democratic by
modern standards, no matter how persistently Southerners declared their commitment to
democratic values. Although the North, too, was far from democratic by modern standards-given its disfranchisement of most of its adult population, its pervasive subordination of African
Americans, and many other defects--even many Southerners recognized that slavery was a
problem for a “democratic” society. But to Southerners, the more important point was that
slavery had to be recognized as their problem. At a visceral level, they understood the
Constitution as protection from outsiders who might “solve” their problems at the price of
economic devastation, race war, and subordination of the white South to the white North.

Scott in the Stream of Constitutional History
Against this background, the Scott case comes to look quite different from its usual
portrayal. It becomes no longer an aggressive move by proslavery diehards but a fierce bid by
Southern moderates to preserve the Union. Moreover, it becomes preeminently a defense of law
just when law most matters: when a majority is poised to destabilize an entire society, heedless
of the consequences that only a targeted minority will have to bear. These justices and the
segments of Southern opinion they reflected were not in the extremist, secessionist camp, but
ranged from the nonslaveholding border state man, Taney, to those who were more deeply
enmeshed in slave society but filled with the common doubts about the slave system (Freehling
2007, 110-13). Only Justice Daniel exhibited extremist tendencies and only after the Wilmot
Proviso (Maltz 2007a, 78-83). Most of the Southern justices shared the extremists’ insistence on
the full equality of the Southern states, slavery and all. But, unlike the extremists, they seem to
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have harbored a range of doubts about slavery itself (Freehling 2007). Generally devoted to the
Union, they continued to insist that the profound problems created by the enslavement of human
beings could only be dealt with by the South in its own way. And the South could do that only if
the law of the Constitution guaranteed the South’s security against those with no direct stake in
Southern society.
This security must imply a firm recognition of Southern rights to both slavery and
equality within the Union, rights that at that level of abstraction were readily identifiable with the
Constitution of 1787. At that same level of abstraction, the Southern justices could understand
the competing interest of the North in maintaining its slave-free version of democratic society.
But the devil was in particular cases, including court cases like Scott, for which the original
Constitution supplied no clear directive (Zuckert 2007). And, while such cases were bound to be
influenced by the justices’ preexisting partialities, recent writing indicates that the Southern
justices were not pursuing anything so crude as a proslavery agenda. Rather, the Southern
majority on the Court sought to resist the intrusions of an increasingly “abolitionist” North, to
reassure Southerners that they remained equals in the American democracy, to equip moderates
to resist extremists in the name of Union, and even to keep alive the hope that the South might
ameliorate the institution of slavery and--perhaps only for the dreamers--one day find a peaceful
road to abolition.
By 1857 the Southern moderate position indeed constituted a “partisan” view of the
Constitution, but so did every position. The Southern moderate view accommodated a heinous
institution, but it recognized that the sin lay originally in the Constitution itself and in
innumerable prior decisions, each of which rested on the irreversible social history of slavery. It
was a view that sought to avoid other towering evils: the failure of the democratic experiment
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and a horrific civil war. It was also a view that had plenty of legal foundation. As “political” as
every justice’s motivations were, certainly including the motivation to secure the South some
breathing room and autonomy, it was also true that these motivations were readily translatable
into constitutional rights: where do Court-declared rights come from but readings of the
constitutional text within the context of the federated politics that the Constitution engendered?
If the question was whether Sanford retained a right of ownership in the Scotts, and if that
question rested on the meaning of Article III, the territories clause, the new states clause, the due
process clause, the privileges and immunities clause, and the broader underlying theories and
purposes of the Constitution, where was the answer to that legal question to be found? The
ambiguities of those provisions certainly had to be resolved in part by some realistic assessment
of how such a Constitution might actually achieve its purposes, unavoidably taking into account
both its adopters’ suppositions and its subsequent history right through to 1857.
And yet the “moderation” of these mostly Unionist judges was expressed with a ferocity
that has not helped them win a sympathetic audience among historians or other scholars. Taney
earned no Northern friends by insisting that the slavery ban in the Missouri Compromise “could
hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law” (Scott, 450). The ferocity, though, was
natural enough. It was the ferocity of moderates who encountered what they took to be
treasonous views that were spreading rapidly through the North. Still, the moderates’ indignant
rhetoric only encouraged Northerners in their inability to distinguish a Southern moderate from a
Southern “ultra,” since both sorts of Southerner seemed to insist on such protection for slavery as
to sacrifice Northern equality and civil liberty.
Of course, some will object to the whole notion that a few decades of self-interested and
partisan politics could legitimately be said to have altered what might count as genuinely legal
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arguments in the Supreme Court. And they might point to Taney’s own strategy in Scott of
emphasizing his originalism, the supposedly unchanging quality of constitutional meaning
through which he defended the legal character of his opinion (Eisgruber 1993). It is necessary,
therefore, to turn finally to the Scott opinions themselves. The foregoing history of slavery and
the Constitution outside the courts will provide the necessary context for close doctrinal analysis
of Taney’s and Curtis’s efforts. And that analysis will illuminate the difference between judging
and unjudicial usurpation at the moment when the justices faced their greatest temptation to cross
that line.

II. THE OPINIONS
The objective of this second part is to take advantage of what I hope is the reader’s
enhanced openness to rethinking the principal opinions in Scott. I have argued with Graber and
others that the history of constitutional politics to 1857 left the South with a very plausible
expectation that its interests might properly be vindicated in a court of law. At the same time,
Northerners held a corresponding expectation that a slavery-limiting position might properly be
vindicated in a case like Scott. These expectations were put to the test when two of the country’s
best-reputed legal minds attempted to resolve judicially some of the great constitutional
questions of the day. Did Taney, often remembered as one of the last defenders of slavery, really
abandon his judicial role to crassly promote sectional interest at the expense of the Constitution?
Did Curtis, a favorite of modern adherents of a postracist Constitution,16 really respond with a
masterwork of legal craftsmanship? Perhaps, from their different perspectives, each man sought
16

It is well known that Justice John McLean was far more deeply and consistently opposed to
slavery than was Curtis and lacked the latter’s full-on racism, but Curtis is generally thought the superior
judicial craftsman and thus, in some respects, the greater hero in Scott.
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only to judge in good faith, to sustain the power of law as an agent of peace in a time of looming
violence. I conclude that, in the end, neither managed to wholly avoid the temptation to reach
beyond the judicial role. Contrary to entrenched orthodoxy, however, it would appear that Taney
devoted himself most thoroughly to vindicating the law, while Curtis may well be the one who
succumbed to unjudicial temptation, abandoning the constraints of law and thus risking violence-for better or worse at this climactic juncture in the history of slavery--to resist the ascendancy of
Southern slaveholders (if not really to oppose slavery itself).
To reach this conclusion, it is necessary to combine the larger history above with a close
reading of the justices’ language. Judicial practice distinctively combines authoritative texts with
historically situated moral, cultural, and policy judgments to construct the law, a law that must be
recognizably directed at the resolution of discrete parties’ controversies, even as it exercises a
clear, even deliberate, but highly indeterminate influence on public policy and political debate.
When the Court does its work well, judicially but never apolitically, it has the potential--as
Graber urges--to nudge the nation toward peaceful resolution of otherwise dangerous conflicts.
It seems clear in retrospect that the Court was in no position to save the nation from Civil
War in Scott. It seems equally clear that the Scott decision was much less a cause of the Civil
War than a “channel” through which the causal currents flowed (Fehrenbacher 1978, 3-4). Try as
they might, the Scott justices had little hope of controlling so momentous a constitutional
controversy. But, while Scott remains an important part of the political narrative of the 1850s, it
also stands as an important episode in American legal history. In context, the evidence of the
opinions suggests that Taney largely adhered to the law and to the judicial role, albeit under a
racist, slavery-accommodating Constitution. Curtis, on the other hand, chose to be on the right
side of history--or at least to resist the slaveholding aristocracy—by writing what he wished the

35

law was rather than what he could show it to be. I come to that conclusion by analyzing several
major aspects of the Taney and Curtis opinions, the last and most important of which is the
difference between Taney’s treatment of the Strader precedent in Scott and Curtis’s failure to
deal at all with that important case.

Taney and Curtis on Citizenship
I’ll begin with the question of the Scotts’ Article III citizenship. On this question,
especially, scholars have thought Curtis the very model of a judge and Taney a cynical
manipulator of the legal materials. But Austin Allen has it nearly right when he says that,
“Curtis’s dissent, despite its popularity among historians, represented little more than a failed
attempt to produce an antislavery ruling within a hopelessly antiabolitionist legal structure”
(Allen 2006, 176). It would be more accurate to call it an “anti-southern” or “anti-slave-power”
opinion within a “slavery-protective” legal structure, but I agree with Allen’s gist. The question
before the Court was whether any native-born person descended from African slaves could
qualify as a “citizen” authorized to sue in diversity under Article III. Taney, of course, answered
in the negative.
The most common grounds for condemning Taney’s rejection of black citizenship are
Curtis’s proofs that at least some states recognized black voting rights in 1787 (Scott, 572-76),
thus showing at least that blacks could be state citizens. But it is well known that many aliens
possessed voting rights in this period (Keyssar 2000, Graber 2006). Possession of the franchise
did not make them citizens. Presumably, the franchise has some significant relationship to
citizenship, but it is and was a problematic one. Oddly, even Curtis’s fans often don’t mention
that Curtis did confront this problem in his dissent. Allen, though, does give Curtis that much
credit while nevertheless demonstrating the weaknesses in Curtis’s imaginative doctrine of
36

citizenship (Allen 2006, 169-177). Curtis met the issue by combining nativity and the
franchise—neither consideration on its own being adequate to prove citizenship. He thus
produced a novel rule that nativity in a particular state combined with that state’s choice to grant
one the franchise must be taken as proof of one’s status as a state citizen and thus, for Curtis, an
Article III “citizen” (Scott, 576-83).
Curtis seems to have made this rule up. He did not make it up out of whole cloth, and
perhaps it was a reasonable rule. But if it was, that was only because the Constitution had
manifestly failed to establish what constituted Article III citizenship (Graber 2006), leaving the
question implicitly to be answered by judicial creativity. Curtis argued fairly enough that the
Constitution anticipated that some persons would gain citizenship by means of native birth, but
not everyone. What further requirements might apply? Curtis asserted there were only four
possibilities (Scott, 577). But none of his possibilities fully accounted for the racism that
underlay much of American constitutional culture in 1787 and 1857 alike. His opinion never
considered whether a universally oppressed class of persons, mostly reduced to property in many
of the Founding states, might be an unlikely group to come within the category of “citizen.”
Curtis moved rapidly to the conclusion that native citizenship was defined exclusively by the
states because of the Constitution’s very failure to define citizenship and because of its
references to citizens of states in a few spots (contexts where critical questions of interstate
relations simply made that usage handy17) (Scott, 579-82). But, when reading a national compact
that deliberately and carefully accommodated racist slavery on a massive scale, he should
17

For example, he pointed to the reference to “citizens of each state” in the Privileges and
Immunities Clause as a strong indication that national citizenship was derivative of state citizenship. But
I don’t see the argument. That clause is an order to the states not to discriminate against out-of-staters.
(See further discussion below.) In that context, it seems pretty natural to speak in terms of citizens of
states, even though citizenship itself might be ultimately a matter of federal law. And, in fact, it seems to
me difficult to rewrite this ban on discrimination against out-of-state American citizens without referring
to the protected as “citizens of each state” or something very like that.
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certainly have considered that a firmly racist reading of the word “citizen”18 was the natural one
to most Southerners and many Northerners.19
Given the indeterminacy of Article III, Taney was at least as well justified in pointing to
the pervasive legal degradation of African Americans in every state in the nation, both in 1787
and after (Scott, 407-421). On this basis, he concluded that they could not have been
contemplated as citizens for any national purpose. For most blacks, of course, the substance of
that degradation was enslavement, but even the free were commonly deprived of other central
rights, like the right to serve on a jury, the right to serve in a militia, or the right to vote on equal
terms with whites. As he strongly implied (Scott, 422) and as Graber develops more fully (2006,
51-52), the often similar political disabilities of women and children at the time would have
struck nearly everyone as qualitatively different in socioconstitutional meaning from those
imposed on blacks regardless of gender and age. The absence of voting rights for women and
children did not deprive them of citizenship. And the possession of voting rights by a small
minority of African Americans no more made that universally oppressed group eligible for legal
citizenship than it did alien voters.
Further, Curtis’s evidence of actual black participation in the ratification of the
Constitution was nil. He usefully proved black eligibility to vote in several states, and it
certainly seems likely that at least some blacks did actually vote. But Curtis’s actual argument
depended only on formal black eligibility and his assumption that this formal and local eligibility
18

Note also that, while a modern lawyer would likely seize on the ambiguity of the Constitution to
conclude that the only legitimate reading must be an anti-racist one, it’s not as if Curtis actually rested his
opinion on a rejection of racism. He often expressed an ugly racism of his own (Streichler 2005). He
read the Constitution here to defend national power and Northern prerogative against Southern insistence
on special rights, but not to embrace abolitionism or opposition to racism.
19
Martin Van Buren, for example, in his Inquiry (1867, 356-58) objected to Taney’s ruling on the
Missouri Compromise as a usurpation but expressed agreement with the holding on citizenship. Graber
also offers evidence that Curtis’s conclusions on the citizenship question were out of step with public and
judicial opinion both North and South (Graber 2006, 28-30).
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must have implied national citizenship at the Founding. It is an important failure on his part,
then, that he offered no evidence of anyone drawing the inference of black citizenship in this
way circa 1787. Nor did he offer any evidence that framers and ratifiers in any state attended to
this question in any degree, much less that they understood it to be settled in favor of black
citizenship. One natural inference, then, is that a tiny number of African Americans, conceivably
none, were recognized by the white majority in a few states as participants in the Founding, even
as white America more generally denied them the basic presumptions of equal dignity that one
might think essential to citizenship.
Finally, Curtis argued that certain early congressional statutes, despite their racism,
seemed to assume the possibility that blacks might be made citizens (Scott, 587). This was a
worthy argument,20 of course, but it and Curtis’s other arguments were readily neutralized by the
mass of Taney’s evidence of black subordination (Scott, 407-421). Nowhere did Curtis squarely
confront Taney’s claim that constitutionally protected black citizenship would have conflicted
with generally held racist assumptions and the requirements of the slaveholding states. Nor did
he even list that position among the possibilities that must “embrace the entire subject” in the
Constitution (Scott, 577).
The point is sharpened, I think, by the following assertion of Curtis’s, with which we
would all like to agree, but which must have befuddled what southern readers he had: “[T]hat
[the Constitution] was made exclusively for the white race is, in my opinion, not only an
assumption not warranted by anything in the Constitution, but contradicted by its opening
20

But not a very strong argument, really, since Taney never claimed that blacks could not be made
citizens of the nation, only that African slaves and their descendants could not be made citizens. Thus,
responding in the formalistic mode that Curtis used here, one need only point out that the statutes that
Curtis relied on, which used phrases like “white male citizen” (implying the possibility that there might
be black citizens) could have been phrased that way on the assumption that there might exist black
citizens by way of naturalization, even though there could not be citizenship among the emancipated or
their descendants.
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declaration, that it was ordained and established by the people of the United States, for
themselves and their posterity” (Scott, 582). For Curtis that unqualified phrase “the people of the
United States” assumed a basic, though limited, equality of races. But it is hard to imagine that
more than a dwindling minority of Southerners read that phrase Curtis’s way at any time
between 1787 and 1857. Nor would Northerners have reliably agreed with him. Senator Stephen
A. Douglas, for example, the most prominent Northern Democratic leader of the 1850s, was a
frequent exponent of the position that the Constitution was made for the white race only
(Johanssen 1973). Since it is standard judicial practice to read specific meanings into general
phrases, it hardly does Curtis credit as a judicial craftsman to ignore the plausibility of probably
the dominant reading of the constitutional language at the time, insisting that only a reading
pregnant with federal jurisdiction for freedom suits could be plausible.
Although I conclude with Allen and Graber that Taney’s opinion makes a much stronger
argument than does Curtis’s on the citizenship question, I hesitate to suggest judicial bad faith on
the basis of anything in this section of either man’s opinion. Taney simply judged that the most
sensible meaning of the word “citizen” in a partly slaveholding and predominantly racist nation
would not include African Americans. Curtis responded with a kind of formalism that is often
resorted to by judges. But, in this case, such formalism could hardly claim such certainty in the
legal sources as might overcome the real history of the nation and its Constitution.

Taney and the Due Process Clause
In the second half of Taney’s opinion, the Chief Justice held that the Missouri
Compromise’s exclusion of slavery from a large part of the territories violated property rights
protected by the Due Process Clause of the national Constitution. This part of the opinion is
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often condemned as, in effect, unjudicial and “partisan” for a variety of different reasons.
Commonly, it is assumed to be dictum, since the prior discussion of citizenship had already
determined the outcome of the case. Fehrenbacher properly dismissed that argument years ago,
accurately observing that this part of the opinion was simply an argument in the alternative on
the question of jurisdiction. I’ll have more to say on that below when I get to Curtis’s own
accusations on that score. Here, I want to discuss the charge by Fehrenbacher that Taney utterly
failed as a judge in his attempt to apply what would come to be called substantive due process
(Fehrenbacher 1978, 379-84). Fehrenbacher ridiculed Taney’s allegedly offhand and
unelaborated reliance on the Due Process Clause. But I think I can show that Taney’s reasoning
was much more elaborate and well founded than Fehrenbacher and others have wanted to allow.
The Surprising Strength of Taney’s Opinion
In the justices’ dispute about congressional power over slavery in the territories, Curtis
emphasized that Congress had repeatedly exercised such a power over many decades, beginning
with the Northwest Ordinance. Taney, on the other hand, rested on the principle of state
equality. Like Curtis, Taney fully embraced substantial governing power for Congress in the
territories (though Taney controversially dismissed the territories clause as the source of that
power in favor of the new states clause).21 The question was whether Congress’s power could

21

Taney has often been condemned for his allegedly shoddy history regarding the original
meaning of the territories clause. These criticisms have contained a good deal of legitimacy even as
they’ve ignored much of the plausibility of some of his arguments. Coming to Taney’s defense, Allen
(2006), for example, rightly points out that the courts were not bound by the common (but hardly
unanimous) assumption that Congress had power over slavery in the territories. Moreover, there were no
judicial cases settling the question. The American Insurance case of 1828, written by Chief Justice
Marshall, certainly tended to support the claim that the territories clause conferred broad power on
Congress over the Florida Territory and thus over pretty much any territory acquired by the United States.
But, as quickly as Marshall’s opinion derived the power from the territories clause, he retracted that firm
conclusion and declared that the power came either from that clause or from the inevitable rights of
sovereignty over acquired territory. 26 U.S. 511, 542-43. I read this as pretty strong evidence that
Marshall personally thought the clause applied to Florida and implicitly would apply to all of the
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extend specifically to excluding slave property.
Taney’s answer rested on the premise that the citizens of all states had equal rights to
enjoy the national territories. Perhaps no one would dispute that principle in the abstract, but
how might it apply in this context? To understand Taney’s perspective, it is necessary to recall
Part I’s socioconstitutional portrait of the antebellum South, which emphasized that slavery and

Louisiana Purchase, but that he felt it necessary or wise to leave that question unsettled. (I’m pretty
convinced that he did so to accommodate Justice William Johnson, who had decided this same case below
and had firmly rested congressional authority on the law of nations. I infer that he would have refused to
join Marshall’s opinion had it rested on the territories clause. 26 U.S. 511, 515 n.*. Johnson had done a
similar thing to Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck, refusing to allow Marshall to declare the unanimity of the
Court unless Marshall rested the opinion on either the contracts clause or on Johnson’s preferred natural
law rather than firmly on the contracts clause itself. For Marshall’s compelled equivocation, see Fletcher
v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 139 (1810), and for the Johnson demurral that forced the equivocation, see pp. 14345.) In any case, Marshall did leave the question unsettled in American Insurance, though it is also fair to
say that the case was more helpful to Taney’s opponents than to him.
More importantly, Taney very plausibly noted that the language of “rules” and “regulations” in
the territories clause bore a close resemblance to those constitutional provisions granting limited,
specified powers. In contrast, that language was not very similar to the grant of plenary congressional
power over the District of Columbia, which granted a power of “exclusive legislation in all cases
whatsoever.” He thus concluded that the territories clause responded to the specific 1787 challenge of
how to manage the western lands then in the process of cession from several states. It applied only to
those territories, not the ones subsequently acquired in the Louisiana Purchase. Consequently, the ban on
slavery found in the Northwest Ordinance constituted no precedent as to the scope of constitutional
authority for other territories. (Allen 2006, 182-89)
Taney’s argument is indeed a strong lawyer’s argument as far as it goes. Its major weakness is
not in his argument about which territories the clause applied to, but in his ignoring the implication that if
Congress really did have the authority to regulate and even ban slavery under the territories clause, then it
was certainly hard to see why it would not have that authority under the new states clause or under
Marshall’s conception of the broad sovereign authority that Congress was assumed to possess over
territories generally. This failure on Taney’s part is not fatal to his argument by any means. As far as I
know, no one put this to him, and there might well have been good reason to conclude that the
Convention meant for Congress to have power over slavery in the original territories of the western
cessions but not thereafter. After all, it was already clear in 1787 that the states collectively meant the
new territories to harbor slavery to the south but not to the north; this understanding might fairly be read
into the territories clause. But that does not at all mean that there was any understanding that Congress
should be able to determine for itself the fate of all territories that might appear in the future. Moreover,
had anyone put to Taney an argument that forced him to confront the history of territorial bans on slavery,
he could of course simply have said that they were all unconstitutional, and there would have been no
judicial precedent, only legislative, to trouble him.
See also Graber (2006, 66-76), who justly argues that, while Taney’s argument had some
substantial grounding, the best conclusion is that the Framers had no clear intentions regarding territories
beyond the western cessions. He insists again that constitutional meaning had to be and was understood to
be settled by practice, which, for Graber, means that congressional power over slavery came to rest on a
principle of southern consent to any restrictions on slavery.
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all its tensions were fundamental to southern society. Thus, for Taney, any responsible reading
of the Constitution had to rest on a recognition of the real danger of insurrection, the
consequently indispensable autonomy of the slave states on questions touching the future of
slavery, and thus the fundamental equality of the slaveholding states, their right not to be
discriminated against on federal matters by virtue of their slaveholding. The lesson from
Freehling and others is that Southerners took this understanding for granted. Moreover, they
took this understanding to be distinctly embraced in the Constitution’s embrace of slaveholding
rights and protections for the slaveholding states. For Taney, then, it could hardly be more
obvious that territorial migrants’ slave property must be protected if state equality were to be
protected. Any practice to the contrary over the years constituted merely political compromises.
Such compromises, he implicitly argued, could not establish a legal principle binding on the
judiciary. They might have their due influence, but they could not control the judiciary in a case
of first impression.
Here is how Taney structured his argument. He began by announcing that he would
consider “by what provision of the Constitution the present Federal Government…is authorized
to acquire territory…and what powers it may exercise therein over the person or property of a
citizen of the United States” (Scott, 446). He adopted the new states clause22 as the authority for
acquiring and, of necessity, governing new territory. Then, he embraced a corollary of that
position that would take him to the “common property” doctrine: “Whatever [the General
Government] acquires, it acquires for the benefit of the people of the several States who created
it. It is their trustee acting for them, and charged with the duty of promoting the interests of the
22

Fehrenbacher could not figure out why Taney went to so much trouble to avoid the territories
clause and use the new states clause instead. But Alfred Brophy suggests that Taney wanted a
constitutional provision that would readily carry the usual constitutional limitations on national power
rather than a provision that could plausibly be argued to give Congress “plenary power”—that is,
unchecked, undemocratic, imperial power--over the territories (Brophy 1990, 209).
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whole people of the Union in the exercise of the powers specifically granted” (Scott, 448). More
specifically, the Louisiana Territory had been acquired
for their common and equal benefit; for it was the people of the several States, acting
through their agent and representative, the Federal Government, who in fact acquired the
Territory in question, and the Government holds it for their common use until it shall be
associated with the other States as a member of the Union. (448)
To ensure that every acquisition inured to the benefit of all, the national government would have
substantial discretion to establish local governments, but in organizing the territory it could not
“infring[e] upon the rights of person or rights of property of the citizen who might go there to
reside, or for any other lawful purpose. It was acquired by the exercise of this discretion, and it
must be held and governed in like manner, until it is fitted to be a State” (449).
So far, the reasoning hardly seems objectionable. The citizenry had equal rights to the
territories, and the national government must respect their constitutional rights in those places.
The problem arose, of course, when Taney applied this doctrine to establish slaveholders’ rights
to migrate with their slaves. Declaring without controversy that migrants retained all their rights
under the Constitution, Taney began to list some of the obvious rights that the federal
government could not infringe. These included rights of speech, religion, peaceable assembly,
jury rights, and so on. In short order, Taney came to the due process clause’s protection of both
property rights and rights of the person. Then the famous sentence:
And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or
property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular
Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence against the laws, could
hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law. (450)
In this sentence, he did not explicitly apply this unobjectionable general principle--the
protectibility of property under the Constitution (Ely 2008; Graber 2006)--to slavery. Nor did he
apply it to any other particular sort of property. Nor did he bother to mention what he could
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hardly have failed to know, given his career on the bench: that, of course, property could be
regulated or even taken under circumstances that adequately justified the impingement. For
Taney, given the common sense of Southern constitutional culture,23 the application of the clause
in these circumstances was too obvious to call for detailed argument. In fact, detailed argument
could only have been taken as a sign of doubt. Taney, I surmise, thought it beneath the Court to
dignify the proposition that the federal government might prevent a Southerner’s bringing the
region’s most valuable property into the common territories. How could the North not
understand that exclusion of slavery would have been just as unthinkable as an exclusion of farm
implements? Thus, he introduced the specific application of these unobjectionable principles to
slavery with these contemptuous words: “It seems, however, to be supposed, that there is a
difference between property in a slave and other property, and that different rules may be applied
to it in expounding the Constitution of the United States” (Scott, 451).
Dismissing what he saw as Curtis’s sophistical attempt to inject the law of nations into
the case, Taney insisted simply that
if the Constitution recognizes the right of property of the master in a slave, and makes no
distinction between that description of property and other property owned by a citizen, no
tribunal, acting under the authority of the United States, whether it be legislative,
executive, or judicial, has a right to draw such a distinction, or deny to it the benefit of
the provisions and guarantees which have been provided for the protection of private
property. (451)
Moreover, the obvious equality of slave property to every other sort of legally protected property
had been confirmed in the Constitution’s protections for the international slave trade and
especially for the slaveholder’s right to regain her or his fugitive property even in free states.
Under the Constitution, he thus argued, “The only power conferred is the power coupled with the
duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights” (452). Concluding this section, Taney
23

And the South thought this a common sense that the North could hardly fail to understand. For
evidence of this, see the capsule biographies of the Southern justices in Maltz (2007, 76-91).
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declared that, “Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the court that the act of Congress
which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the territory of the
United States north of the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by the Constitution” (452).
Contrary to the claims of Fehrenbacher, Taney’s due process argument was in fact made
at some length and with some care throughout this section of the opinion. Taney deployed a
cogent logic--if one began with those assumptions that Southerners thought too fundamental to
be questioned: the assumptions of slave-state equality and the centrality of slavery to Southern
life (though not any claim to the rightness of slavery).
None of this means that Taney was unambiguously right in his construction of the law at
that time. Looking at those same constitutional provisions with a Republican eye, it is easy to
observe that the clause on the international slave trade actually seemed a limitation on rights to
slave property and reflective of a common Founding expectation that slavery would wither
before the march of liberty (Fehrenbacher 1978, 24). Similarly, the Republican Justice McLean,
for example, was right to point out that state equality could cut more than one way. From his
point of view, the admission of slavery into the territories effectively cut out untold numbers of
potential Northern migrants who would justly refuse to subject themselves to life in an
antirepublican society (Scott, 543).
But what reason do we have for insisting that Taney’s only honest, judicial option was to
adopt that Republican position? What was there in a constitution that embraced slavery, both in
its text and its history, that would rule out Taney’s version of Southern equality? What in such a
constitution would prevent the finding of a slaveholder’s due process right to bring her or his
property to the territory, just the same as a Northern migrant might bring her or his most essential
property?

46

The often admired counterargument from Curtis comprised mainly a brief review of prior
prohibitions of slave migration and trade, none of which had been thought to implicate due
process or its equivalents (626-27). But it is easy to see how Curtis’s citations of such precedents
could have been viewed as missing the point. The Northwest Ordinance, for example, barring
slavery from a huge territory, had been endorsed by most slave states, not imposed on them.
They had endorsed it in part because the Ordinance might serve the economic interests of slave
states (as opposed to rendering them subordinate), in part because the southwest was guaranteed
to southern migrants as an equivalent, and in part because there was a near consensus that each
state’s interest was advanced by adding more states as long as sectional balance was maintained
(Freehling 1990, 138; Onuf 1983, 169-71). For Graber, then, the pertinent constitutional rule that
underlay the Ordinance’s ban on slavery was not that any old congressional majority could ban
slavery from any territory, but that it could do so when it had slave-state consent. I would add
that what underlay that notion was Taney’s principle of state equality, the idea that congressional
regulation of property rights in slaves must rest on a foundation of slave-state equality.
These conditions of congressional legislation seemed no longer satisfied in 1857, the first
time that the Court had occasion to address the question, regardless of whether they had been in
1787 or 1820. Curtis’s reliance on the political deals that created the Northwest Ordinance and
the Missouri Compromise manifested an appropriate respect for the constitutional practice of
coordinate branches of government. But no one would say that congressional practice had ever
been understood as binding on the courts in any justiciable case, especially when the premises of
a particular constitutional settlement--here, Northern acceptance of Southern slaveholding
equality—appeared to be obsolete by the time the Court confronted the issue.
Curtis’s other examples of regulation of slave property faced similar difficulties as
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precedents. He noted that the laws of many states, slave and free, emancipated slaves who were
voluntarily brought into the state to reside. No one cried “due process” in these instances. But,
while these laws might have burdened slaveholders’ property rights, they did so in a way that
preserved rather than undermined the equality and the autonomy of the states, here protecting
their equal powers to regulate their domestic institutions as they liked. Such powers bore no
analogy to a putative federal power to subordinate the interests of one half of the states in the
common territories. Finally, the ban on the international slave trade might, as Curtis argued,
deprive an American citizen of property bought outside the United States and imported within
the borders. That ban, however, was again produced with broad slave-state support (Mason
2000) and was never taken as subordinating the interests of the slave states to those of the free.
Given the indeterminacy of the original Constitution itself on the question of slavery in
the territories, Taney’s due process claim was hardly unreasonable, let alone unjudicial. Nor,
despite my criticisms here, was much of Curtis’s response. He offered a worthy, if not
particularly tight, argument by combining the history of exclusion as early as the Northwest
Ordinance with the failure of any due process clause to interfere with regulations of slave
property before 1857.24 Taney’s resort to strict originalism--a stock piece of judicial
disingenuousness in the face of uncertain evidence--did not really help him to answer Curtis,
given both the indeterminacy of the text and the adoption of the Northwest Ordinance
contemporaneously with the Constitution. Curtis’s argument, in sum, was at least judicially
respectable to this point.
But then he went further, abandoning judicially plausible argument and professional
detachment to indulge in this embarrassing objection to Taney’s due process claim:
24

But Alfred Brophy (1990, 211-14) has found evidence that Taney’s deployment of the due
process clause was not wholly without precedent in this respect.
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Moreover, if the [due process] right exists, what are its limits, and what are its
conditions?... And what law of slavery does [any migrant] take with him to the Territory?
If it be said to be those laws respecting slavery which existed in the particular State from
which each slave last came, what an anomaly is this? Where else can we find, under the
law of any civilized country, the power to introduce and permanently continue diverse
systems of foreign municipal law, for holding persons in slavery? (Scott, 625-26,
emphasis added)
Curtis’s language has nothing to do with Taney’s argument. Taney’s defense of a due process
right to retain one’s property hardly constituted an argument against coherent and pragmatic
regulation of that right. Far from claiming that due process prevented any regulation touching
slaves in any way or that state equality required the importation of every nuance of diverse
states’ laws into the territories, he simply rejected a specific sort of deprivation of property:
deprivation of the slave property of any migrant who came from a slave state to the territorial
“common property.” If due process manifestly barred at least some congressional impingements
on migrants’ property, Taney argued, then those forbidden actions must include Congress’s
preventing one set of settlers from migrating with their slave property as readily as it would bar
the exclusion of others with their plows or wagons. Curtis’s argument did not lack its own power
in places, but it was as decidedly partial as Taney’s, deeply discounting the South’s widely held
understanding of the essentials of its society and its equality within the Union.
Taney’s Opinion and the History of Constitutional Politics
An important moral of this story so far is that the Court must be seen as one actor in a
larger constitutional politics, a distinctive actor but one nevertheless inevitably and rightly
attentive to the social, economic, and political history that must give shape to constitutional
history and constitutional law. So I want to develop the importance of the fact that the Court got
the Scott case in 1857 rather than some years or decades earlier. The point, though, is not that
the Court became tainted by politics in the fevered atmosphere of 1857 in a way that it might not
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have at another time. Rather, a properly judicial approach to a case cannot help but take account
of the history of constitutional politics up to the particular moment of decision. Thus, although
neither Taney nor many other judges would come right out and say it, the claim that the 1820
legislation was unconstitutional depended, in important part, on the post-1820 history of
constitutional politics. This is one of Graber’s main claims and one I mean to reinforce here.
Imagine that a case challenging the Missouri Compromise had come before the Court in,
say, 1827, rather than coming to the Court in 1857 as a case of first impression. The 1827
Marshall Court very likely would have sustained the federal ban, perhaps on the basis of that
Court’s nationalist tendencies, or out of deference to Congress’s constitutional judgment, or in
recognition that such an important legislative compromise, so recently established, should not be
upset by a court. A subsequent Taney Court then would have confronted the Scotts’ particular
claims within a very different legal situation—one governed by square precedent—and in light
of a constitutional history of the intervening decades that would have looked significantly
different.
As it was, though, the Court had managed for thirty-seven years never to pronounce on
the question of the legislation’s constitutionality. The precedents it had to deal with were only
the political precedents by which the nation had come widely, though not universally, to assume
congressional power to bar slavery from particular territories. But the legitimacy of that
congressional power had arguably depended on the South’s own acceptance of the Missouri
Compromise as a fair enough bargain, not on a clear vindication of congressional power to ban
slavery in the territories generally. And the maintenance of that bargain’s legitimacy over time
arguably rested on the transsectional quality of national politics, anchored by a Democratic Party
that effectively preserved the Southern right to veto federal regulations of slavery.
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The event that unsettled this arrangement, as I have said, was the introduction and
passage in the House of the Wilmot Proviso (Hyman and Wiecek 1982, 115-140; Maltz 2007,
ch.4). Introduced in no spirit of compromise and without any expectation of Southern support,
the Proviso represented an insistence on sectional equality within their own party by aggrieved
northern Democrats. But it was read by many southern Democrats as a slap in the face and an
expression of contempt from their erstwhile allies in the fight for democracy. Before this time,
restrictions on slavery in the territories had been arguably extra-constitutional, bi-sectional
compromises, political arrangements with which courts had little to do in practice or in principle.
After Wilmot’s action, however, the defenders of the South saw their fate slipping into the hands
of an ever more shockingly abolitionist North. The waiver of constitutional rights embodied in
the Missouri Compromise had once been compensated by both the admission of a slave state and
an understanding, so Graber argues, that Southern consent was essential to any federal regulation
of slavery. After Wilmot, that arrangement gradually fell apart.
To the extent that Southerners came to see the evaporation of their power to veto antisouthern legislation, the Missouri Compromise lost its constitutional foundations in their eyes.
And all remaining ambiguity disappeared with the emergence of the Republican Party and the
declaration of its eloquent leader that, while he would not interfere with slavery in the states, he
would nevertheless determinedly put it in a condition where its ultimate elimination might be
relied on (Graber 2006, 134; Fehrenbacher 1978, 487). By the mid-1850s, Southerners had
every justification for believing that the North was indeed turning genuinely abolitionist, the
differences between the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison and Abraham Lincoln mattering as
little to Southerners as the differences between the fire-eater William Lowndes Yancey and
Roger Taney mattered to Northerners.
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In this context, the Scott case came to the Court without any clear precedent, such as my
imaginary Marshall Court case, but laden with the obligation that the Court consider the realities
of the judicial role in the nation’s larger constitutional politics. It could hardly be surprising that
a Southern justice, desperate to preserve peace and the Union as against the violent tendencies of
secessionists and abolitionists alike, might move to defend the Southern veto as a legal corollary
of basic principles of the Constitution. Confronting the legal question at the heart of the crisis
for the first time and confronting the substantial indeterminacy of the legal texts, the Taney Court
could hardly be unaffected by the constitutional politics of the thirty-seven years since the
enactment of the legislation. Nor was the Court likely to be controlled by that politics in any
simple, direct way. But within the plausibly judicial range of options created by the
conventional legal sources and the constitutional politics surrounding those sources, certainly
there was a powerful argument for deeming the Missouri Compromise a violation of
slaveholders’ due process rights. The Court might adopt a suitably judicial formalism and
declare those rights violated ab initio. Or it might take the less judicious route of declaring that
slaveholders’ rights were violated as of, say, the defection of Wilmot or Van Buren or, in any
case, sometime before 1857. As written, however, Taney’s due process holding, for all the
uniqueness and momentousness of its context, stands as fully, imperfectly judicial.
Taney’s Unjudicial Moment
And yet, in this section of Taney’s opinion, there is one egregious, unjudicial passage. It
does not really appear out of place on first consideration and it is a mere two sentences of a 55page opinion, but in context it represents a highly unjudicial departure by Taney. In the course
of arguing that migrants in the territories remained covered by the Bill of Rights, Taney
remarked that, “if Congress itself cannot [disregard migrants’ constitutional rights]—if it is
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beyond the powers conferred on the Federal Government—it will be admitted, we presume, that
it could not authorize a Territorial Government to exercise them. It could confer no power on
any local Government, established by its authority, to violate the provisions of the Constitution.”
(Scott, 451)
This passage was dictum, since there was no claim in the case that any of the Scotts were
rendered free by the action of any territorial government. Of course, its status as dictum does not
in and of itself render this part of the opinion unjudicial. It could conceivably be harmless
dictum or, perhaps, a perfectly responsible extension of the reasoning of the case to guide lower
courts. After all, those courts might well encounter Scott-like claims involving territorial laws
rather than congressional laws. It is also true that the passage appeared before Taney came to the
specific application of his argument to the slavery question, and he never returned to the subject
of this passage.
None of these defenses of Taney can stand, though, because this passage is actually the
only one in the opinion that addresses the question then most starkly threatening the Union.
Across the 1840s and 1850s, the Union was held together chiefly by the Democratic Party, the
only truly transsectional institution in the nation. But the Democrats spent all of their postWilmot existence before the Civil War struggling to find a unifying position on the question of
slavery in the territories. The closest they came on this question was the doctrine of popular or
territorial sovereignty, adopted and championed by Douglas in the 1850s. This doctrine held that
the decision whether to admit slavery to a territory must belong to the residents of that territory.
That was a promising principle to some, but in practice it only raised the question of when the
residents might make that momentous decision. Could the first handful of residents in the
territory vote to exclude slavery and thus slaveholders and thus pro-slavery votes? Or must the
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residents of a territory wait, uncertain of the ultimate nature of their society, slave or free, until
the moment of statehood? The principle of territorial sovereignty was no principle at all unless it
could say something about timing that both North and South would accept as equal treatment.
By the time of the Scott decision, no such resolution was at hand, and the ill-fated race to
control the Territory of Kansas was already underway. Democrat James Buchanan had just
assumed the presidency and implied in his inaugural address that the Supreme Court would settle
the question of territorial sovereignty imminently in its Scott decision. But that question was not
before the Scott Court. The constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise was before the Court,
but territorial sovereignty was not. Taney’s two sentences quoted above, therefore, strongly
implying that a territorial government could not at any stage of things ban slavery from its
territory, constituted a flagrantly unjudicial exploitation of a case before the Court. Departing
from the questions actually at issue, with hardly a suggestion that lower courts required guidance
on a related question, Taney attempted to put the cultural and political weight of the judiciary on
one side of a negotiation, however futile, that was still being conducted in the other branches of
the government and in the nation’s public life. Northern Democrats like Douglas pressed on
with the policy of territorial sovereignty despite Taney’s dictum, but now with an even bigger
hurdle to jump in the race to save the Union.

Was Curtis’s Dissent Unjudicial?
In the sections just above, I have tried to vindicate the legal quality of Taney’s opinion
and, in the process, offered what I think are serious criticisms of Justice Curtis’s dissent. But I
have so far stopped short of arguing that Curtis’s supposed masterpiece should actually be
deemed unjudicial. The weaknesses already mentioned, however, are far from the only
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vulnerabilities in that opinion. In fact, there are far more important ones that can and should be
used to take Curtis’s work off its legal pedestal and suggest, therefore, that Curtis’s work was
driven not so much by a devotion to law and judicial craftsmanship as by a determination to
resist Southern power.
I will discuss several of the dissent’s flaws and conclude with the most serious: Curtis’s
evasion of Strader, a case of such importance to the Scott questions that Curtis’s refusal to
engage with it finally supports a judgment that the dissent was not just a politicized opinion but
one fairly characterized as unjudicial. In saying that, I do not condemn Curtis. Perhaps by 1857,
the time for adhering scrupulously to the judicial role was past. Perhaps adhering to that role
would only have entrenched the outsized power of the slaveholding interest in American
governance (Fehrenbacher and McAfee 2001, Richards 2000). In any case, I do not think that
Curtis’s opinion can ultimately be explained by positing a desire to vindicate the law as such.
Rather, I think it is best explained by Curtis’s readiness to consider the larger implications of the
case in 1857, larger implications that always have the potential to inform the law as such but that
Curtis proved unable to assimilate to law.
Sua Sponte Inquiry into Jurisdiction
Before getting to Strader, it is important to ventilate the other major problems with
Curtis’s work. The case opened with some rather technical questions of jurisdiction. Curtis
rightly addressed these at some length but not with the impartiality one might desire. Sanford had
challenged federal jurisdiction in the court below and lost but had not sought review of that
question because the final judgment had come out his way. When the Scotts sought review,
then, the Court had to determine whether it might review sua sponte the lower court’s ruling on
jurisdiction—that is, the trial court’s holding that the Scotts might count as Article III citizens,
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eligible to sue in federal court, despite their descent from African slaves. As I read Curtis’s
analysis of this question, however, it seems clear that he bent the sources out of shape so that he
could, first, address the Missouri Compromise questions himself and, second, condemn Taney’s
attempt to reach that question as well.
In affirming the Court’s authority to consider questions of jurisdiction, Curtis used the
following language, endorsing sua sponte inquiry:
I consider, therefore, that when there was a plea to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in
a case brought here by a writ of error, the first duty of this court is, sua sponte, if not
moved to it by either party, to examine the sufficiency of that plea; and thus to take care
that neither the Circuit Court nor this court shall use the judicial power of the United
States in a case to which the Constitution and laws of the United States have not extended
that power. (Scott, 567)
Taney took a similar position and used it to join Curtis in reviewing the plea in abatement as
such, with its question whether any native black American could be an Article III citizen. But
Taney used it further to justify consideration of the Missouri Compromise question as well. By
treating that question too as a matter of jurisdiction (since a ruling that the Scotts remained slaves
and therefore not citizens would doubly deprive the federal courts of Article III jurisdiction) and
by affirming the Court’s power to entertain such jurisdictional questions sua sponte, Taney
rendered his holding on the Missouri Compromise just that—holding, not dictum. Curtis did not
mind Taney’s addressing the citizenship question, but he clearly didn’t want Taney addressing
the Missouri Compromise at all and so, despite his language quoted above, he was determined to
find a way to brand Taney’s discussion extrajudicial.
How did he do that? Although he had insisted on federal courts’ limiting themselves to
their legitimate jurisdiction, even sua sponte, he contrived to limit the scope of this principle so
that he could label Taney’s jurisdictional discussion dictum. Sua sponte inquiry into jurisdiction
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extended, he said, only to review of an unappealed plea to the jurisdiction in the trial court, not
to matters of jurisdiction never disputed as such by the parties. He took this position even
though the underlying justification for his own jurisdictional inquiry was “the principle that the
judicial power of the United States must not be exerted in a case to which it does not extend,
even if both parties desire to have it exerted” (Scott, 567). That principle would imply a sua
sponte obligation, the one exercised by Taney, to inquire into jurisdiction even beyond the
specifics of a plea to the jurisdiction below.
Despite that principle, Curtis clung to his narrower claim and then pointed out (correctly
enough) that the plea below did not aver the Scotts’ status as slaves, thus that no party had
suggested an absence of jurisdiction on the basis of the Scotts’ slave status. This observation set
up Curtis’s later claim that the second half of Taney’s opinion was therefore dictum. To support
this move, Curtis read some highly technical precedents aggressively in his own favor (Scott,
589-90), readings that Earl Maltz has firmly disputed despite being a fan of Curtis’s opinion
(Maltz 2007b), rather than implementing his sensible principle that federal judges must guard
against exercising federal power where not authorized by positive law.
Curtis’s disingenuousness is further demonstrated by his subsequent language
condemning Taney’s sua sponte inquiry:
A great question of constitutional law [the Missouri Compromise question], deeply
affecting the peace and welfare of the country, is not, in my opinion, a fit subject to be
thus reached.
But as, in my opinion, the Circuit Court had jurisdiction, I am obliged to consider
the question whether its judgment on the merits of the case should stand or be reversed.
(590)
A reasonable enough statement on its face, it would have been at least as well applied against
Curtis himself rather than used against Taney. Curtis had many ways of avoiding this “great
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question of constitutional law” and no good way to justify reaching it. As I will argue below, a
fair engagement with the Strader precedent almost certainly would have kept the Missouri
Compromise out of the case. Similarly, Curtis could have stuck with his claim that the contracts
clause guaranteed the Scotts’ emancipation without getting into the constitutionality of the
Missouri Compromise (Maltz 2007b; more on that below). Finally, he could have simply
dissented without further opinion, a common enough practice in those days. Moreover, it is
critical that he did not say that he was compelled to carry on because Taney had; he was not
simply answering Taney on a question that Taney should never have injected into the opinion.
Rather, his words made clear that he was going on to the Missouri Compromise question no
matter what, exploiting his role as a justice to pronounce on a constitutional question then before
the country but not necessarily before the Court. At the same time, he denied Taney the right to
discuss that same issue, despite Taney’s equally plausible, if equally self-serving, argument that
he was merely completing his inquiry into the court’s jurisdiction.
Curtis’s language thus lends weight to the claim that Taney addressed the Missouri
Compromise only because Curtis and McLean had made clear that they would.25 No doubt,
Taney wanted his opinion to cover all the ground and settle the national question, as did Curtis
25

Scholars of the case have argued for some time about the sequence of events that led to the
opinions’ covering the issues they did. Maltz (2007, 106-117) offers a concise, recent account. At one
point, all agree, it was the determination of the justices to allow New York’s Justice Nelson to write a
more or less minimalist opinion deferring to the authority of the Missouri Supreme Court on a Missouri
question. It is clear, though, that there were Northern justices determined to write dissents that would
address the Missouri Compromise and Southern justices who badly wanted an opinion that would
vindicate Southern rights much more broadly than Nelson’s would have. Did Taney ultimately write
because he knew that McLean and Curtis would and could not let them go unanswered? Did Curtis write
only when he was sure that the Southerners were certain to write an opinion reaching the Missouri
Compromise? The precise dynamics within the Court cannot be nailed down, but I think it is fair to say
that Curtis was not simply reacting to a gratuitous provocation from Taney. Rather, both sides had
increasingly become convinced that it was in some sense their responsibility to give an authoritative
judicial reading of the Constitution in its relations to territorial slavery. Curtis’s opinion was not simply a
matter of a dissenter disputing the majority’s illegitimate discussion of the Missouri Compromise.
Rather, it was the product of Curtis’s considered decision, for better or worse, to announce in his official
capacity his view of the constitutional question regardless of whether the Southerners did.
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apparently. But, even if he’d wanted to write more narrowly, he could hardly have sat back and
watched Curtis make the anti-Southern case without an answer from the Court, as long as there
was a legitimate legal route to the question for him. More to the point, as long as Curtis was
determined to go on to the Missouri question, he was hardly in a position to complain that Taney
was addressing the question as well. It’s difficult to blame him for doing whatever proved
necessary to undermine any slavery-entrenching pronouncement from the Court, but such a
motivation was, of course, at least as partisan as any motivation of Taney’s. As Allen (2006,
181) notes, the weight of scholarly opinion has been that the second half of Taney’s opinion was
not dictum. Yet the charge has been repeated ever since, and even those who know better have
failed to take Curtis to task for disingenuously insisting that it was.26
The Privileges and Immunities Clause
Curtis next looked to neutralize the Southern parade of horribles said to lie within the
privileges and immunities clause. Southerners claimed that recognition of black citizenship
would empower black citizens to enter the slave states and claim dangerous rights of travel, of
free speech, of property, even the right to vote and to hold federal and even state offices. To
Southerners, it was obvious that such rights for blacks would instantly destroy the racist
discipline that preserved the peace. Hardly a racial liberal himself (Streichler 2005), Curtis
resisted the argument by painting the privileges and immunities clause as perfectly
accommodating to racist discrimination; it barred discrimination only against out-of-state
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Fehrenbacher was clearly of the view that Taney’s treatment of the Missouri Compromise was
not dictum at all, thus disagreeing with Curtis, but he never squarely faced Curtis’s deep vulnerability on
this score, preferring to portray Curtis’s argument as “very impressive” (Fehrenbacher 1978, 330-32, 40314, quotation at 4). A limited exception is Maltz (2007b, 275-76), who acknowledges that Curtis’s
position was so untenable that it must be attributed to the “heat of the controversy.” Maltz more or less
excuses Curtis for this by supposing that he had no desire to address the Missouri Compromise and was
angered by Taney’s virtually compelling him to. Maltz also thinks that this mistake was just one slip-up
in an otherwise sound and eminently judicial opinion (265).
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persons as such. Thus each state would remain perfectly free to apply its racist distinctions and
discipline to out-of-state blacks just as they applied to in-state blacks, regardless of anyone’s
status as a citizen (Scott, 582-584).
That is a plausible argument on first impression (though deeply racist). But at the time
there persisted a widely held and, at least in its more limited form, an almost irresistible view to
the contrary. Many believed that the privileges and immunities clause actually did guarantee an
undefined but substantial body of basic rights to every American citizen (Smith 1997; Curtis
2000). Without some such core set of rights, what would citizenship even mean? At a
minimum, these rights would have included a freedom to travel into any state. Even that
minimal right—a right of free blacks to travel through slave states with their freedom and their
citizenship (if not their full equality) guaranteed by federal law--was thought to endanger the
allegedly indispensable system of racist discipline. The failure of Curtis to acknowledge so
serious an implication manifested at least as partisan a view of the law as anything that Taney
wrote. (And the thorough-going racism of Curtis’s argument makes him hardly more appealing
than Taney in this phase of the argument.)
Strader and Comity
While there is no smoking gun in Curtis’s dissent quite as clear as those in Marbury v.
Madison (1803) and Bush v. Gore (2000), I think that Curtis’s treatment of Missouri’s claim to
final authority over the status of its inhabitants—regardless of the status of the Missouri
Compromise or other foreign law--and especially his evasion of the precedent in Strader v.
Graham (1850) well justifies the judgment that his opinion was an unjudicial bid to resist the
entrenchment of Southern power. Strader declared in 1850 that the slave status (or not) of any
inhabitant of any state was a question firmly within the control of that state. Curtis believed that
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the law of Illinois and/or the Missouri Compromise would have freed the Scotts, but here he had
to confront the Strader claim that such putative, out-of-state emancipations were irrelevant and
without authority once the Scotts were back in Missouri. The Missouri Supreme Court, after all,
had explicitly declined to extend comity on the question of slave status in the Scotts’ own case.
Curtis responded by ignoring Strader completely while insisting on the novel proposition that
slave status was a matter of general law in the mode of Swift v. Tyson (1842)27 rather than forum
law.28
Curtis commenced his efforts to avoid Strader by artificially separating the question of
Missouri’s obligation to enforce the Scotts’ freedom into two parts. Rather than begin with a
clear analysis of the most pertinent federal case law, he took a confusing and useless detour into
some legal metaphysics. Thus, he chose first to analyze whether the emancipating laws of
Congress and Illinois purported affirmatively to dissolve the slave’s status as slave—that is,
harbored the extraterritorial ambition “absolutely to dissolve the relation, and terminate the rights
27

Some cases come into federal court under “diversity jurisdiction”; that is, when the opposing
parties are from different or “diverse” states and are thus entitled under Article III to be heard in federal
court rather than in the courts of the home state of one of the parties, even though no federal law is
involved in the case. For some (but not all) categories of diversity cases, Swift v. Tyson (1842) held that
federal courts would apply “general law”--that is, the federal judges’ own notion of appropriate
substantive law--even when it differed substantially from the law that the pertinent state court would have
applied in the same case. Before Curtis wrote his Scott opinion, the Supreme Court had never thought
general law applicable to questions of slave status.
28
Note, though, that Curtis never unambiguously answered the question whether he, as a federal
judge, conceived himself an enforcer of Missouri state law or of an independently founded general law of
personal status. He seemed mostly to insist that the Missouri courts were obliged to recognize the Scotts’
freedom as a matter of their own law, since he articulated the chief question at issue in this way: “whether
the State of Missouri recognizes and allows the effect of that law of the Territory [the Missouri
Compromise law], on the status of the slave, on his return within its jurisdiction” (Scott, 590, emphasis in
original). Still, as I’ll note below, there are other indications that he might have recognized the power of
the Missouri courts to do as they did. After all, he never suggested that the Court could have overturned
the Missouri Supreme Court decision if it had been appealed directly. No one seems to have disputed the
notion that the Court would have lacked jurisdiction over such an appeal and thus would have been forced
to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Missouri court’s ruling. The heart of his argument, then, however
obscurely articulated at times, was that the Court nevertheless retained its own authority to disregard
Missouri law as announced by the Missouri Supreme Court and instead apply general law in federal
diversity jurisdiction.
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of the master existing under the law of the country whence the parties came” (Scott, 591). If they
purported to do so, then, Curtis seemed to believe, Missouri would bear an obligation to embrace
the Scotts’ foreign emancipation. Alternatively, if those foreign laws simply refused state
support for the owner’s implementation of the slave relation within the jurisdiction, Missouri
would not have to treat the returning Scotts as emancipated.
Apparently, Curtis believed that these two ostensibly different kinds of laws would have
different consequences for the Scotts. But it is very hard to see why they would. The foreign
emancipation amounts to a full emancipation in the foreign jurisdiction (Illinois or the Wisconsin
Territory) in either case. Whether the local law declares the freedom of every erstwhile slave
who enters the jurisdiction or just declares that its laws will not protect the erstwhile master’s
right to enforce obedience, the state carries out an emancipation. But in neither case is there any
obvious reason to think that that emancipation has any extraterritorial authority in the forum state
(Missouri), except as some law of the forum prescribes. And Curtis never explained why there
would be. He simply chose to identify the Missouri Compromise as a statute with extraterritorial
ambitions, even as he failed to explain why Congress got to have such ambitions honored
(assuming implausibly that those ambitions existed at all) at the expense of Missouri’s authority
over the status of its inhabitants. In other words, the question remained, what law obliged
Missouri courts to recognize a change in status for the Scotts within the boundaries of
Missouri?29

29

Curtis’s effort to demonstrate the existence of a law that would so oblige the Missouri courts was
exceedingly tortured and dependent on a disingenuous over-reading of case law. He relied chiefly on the
opinion of Henry St. George Tucker in Betty v. Horton (Va., 1833), a case where the allegedly important
distinction between the two kinds of laws above “is very clearly stated” (Scott, 592). In that case, a
Massachusetts citizen married into ownership of two slaves in Virginia and removed them to
Massachusetts, somewhat later moving permanently to Virginia with the “slaves” in tow. Ultimately
deciding the case in favor of emancipation entirely under Virginia statute law, Tucker’s opinion
recognized only in dictum that, had a Massachusetts court actually declared the slaves free while in
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Curtis did pay lip service to Missouri’s authority by positive law to deny recognition to
foreign emancipations, so it was just Missouri’s courts that he thought the federal courts could
and should order around. But he had a very difficult time explaining why. He deemed it
adequate simply to accuse the Missouri Supreme Court of acting on political motivations and
then substitute the federal Supreme Court’s authority for that of the Missouri Court:
[I]n my opinion, it is not within the province of any judicial tribunal to refuse such
recognition [of foreign laws] from any political considerations, or any view it may take of
the exterior political relations between the State and one or more foreign States, or any
impressions it may have that a change of foreign opinion and action on the subject of
slavery may afford a reason why the State should change its own action. To understand
and give just effect to such considerations, and to change the action of the State in
consequence of them, are functions of diplomatists and legislators, not of judges. (Scott,
594-95)
But even if the Missouri decision was properly characterized as “political,” what law authorized
the substitution of Justice Curtis’s own view of Missouri law?
Curtis’s strongest argument was that the marriage of the Scotts, consented to by their
owners and solemnized in free territory, vitiated any attempt to maintain their slave status (Scott,
599-601). Curtis claimed that, once the Scotts were freed either by the Missouri Compromise
law or by the consent of their owners (as manifested in their endorsement of the marriage), their
Massachusetts, then “national law” would have required the Virginia courts to enforce that ruling.
Presumably, he referred to the Full Faith and Credit Clause (FFC) of the Constitution. But, of course, the
Scotts had no such adjudication and no claim on the FFC when they sued in Missouri. Tucker had gone
on to opine that Virginia courts would have “respect[ed] and follow[ed]” Massachusetts law in this case
even without an adjudication if it were shown that Massachusetts law had been interpreted on such facts
to emancipate slaves of its own force (and in that sense to be “more operative than the common law”).
But he nowhere indicated that that result would have flowed from anything but the Virginia court’s
exercise of comity as a kind of discretionary equivalent of the FFC’s rule for actual adjudications.
Nothing in the case supports Curtis’s search for a principle that Virginia (in Betty v. Horton) or Missouri
(in Scott) bore some obligation to recognize extraterritorial ambitions of free states or territories. Nor
does the case even clearly draw the distinction that Curtis relied on between emancipations intended fully
to dissolve an individual’s slave status and emancipations intended only to deny the owner the assistance
of the law domestically. It is possible that that distinction too was in Tucker’s mind—there is language
that could possibly indicate so--but what he actually wrote about, only in passing and only in what was
explicitly acknowledged as dictum, was the relationship between the authority of foreign adjudications
via the FFC and the authority of foreign law without an adjudication, presumably via comity.

63

marriage was protected even in Missouri by “international law”—by which Curtis simply meant
principles of law embraced across many jurisdictions--and by the contracts clause of the federal
Constitution. And, since slave status was inconsistent with marriage, Missouri could not reassert
the slave status of the Scotts. But the same source that Curtis cited for the principle of
international law that “a marriage, valid by the law of the place where it was contracted, . . . is
valid everywhere” (Scott, 599) also noted that there were exceptions to that rule. Curtis did not
mention these exceptions, which, taken together, suggested the almost unavoidable principle that
recognition of foreign marriages would always face some limits in the public policies of the
forum state.30 And it was not for Curtis to tell Missouri what its public policy might have to say
about legal recognition of a marriage like the Scotts’.
Perfectly aware of the Missouri court’s explication of its own state law in its own
disposition of the Scotts’ claims, Curtis grasped for some means to deny that Court’s authority to
articulate law for the Scotts’ circumstances. He thus asserted finally that questions of slave status
should be treated as matters of general law rather than state law--much as Swift treated the law of

30

Joel Prentiss Bishop’s 1856 Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce, and Evidence
in Matrimonial Suits did take quite an expansive view of Curtis’s quoted principle but still recognized
that incest and polygamy formed recognized exceptions and assumed that mental incapacity would do so
as well (Bishop 1856, §§125-30). And Curtis’s sharp but fleeting reference to the Dartmouth College
Case on the contracts clause issue effectively opened but hardly closed the question of how the contracts
clause might apply. Like Bishop’s treatise, the Dartmouth College Court had given no thought to the
distant question whether the institution of slavery might create exceptions to the general obligation to
recognize out-of-state marriages, especially given the Constitution’s substantial accommodation of
slavery. No state need recognize within its borders a marriage that violates its public policy in a
sufficiently important way, Bishop grudgingly acknowledged. (Earl Maltz agrees that “To the extent that
it relied on the claim that Missouri was constitutionally required to recognize the validity of the
Wisconsin marriage, [Curtis’s] analysis was doctrinally suspect” (Maltz 2007b, 270-71).) And the
Dartmouth College Court, of course, focused its energies on questions totally unrelated to whether a state
would have been legally and constitutionally required to recognize a marriage between persons whom it
would otherwise have considered slaves. Curtis offered the beginnings of a serious argument here, but his
utter unwillingness to consider the limits of “international law” and the contracts clause under a
Constitution that accommodated slavery and offered states substantial autonomy marked his opinion as
highly partial and incomplete. For an extended discussion of the significance (or not) of the Scotts’
marriage, see VanderVelde and Subramanian (1997, 1103-17).
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contracts--even though they had never before been so treated by the Court:
[W]e come to the consideration whether the rules of international law, which are part of
the laws of Missouri until displaced by some statute not alleged to exist, do or do not
require the status of the plaintiff, as fixed by the laws of the Territory of Wisconsin, to be
recognized in Missouri. Upon such a question, not depending on any statute or local
usage, but on principles of universal jurisprudence, this court has repeatedly asserted it
could not hold itself bound by the decisions of State courts, however great respect might
be felt for their learning, ability, and impartiality. (See Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters's R., 1;
Carpenter v. The Providence Ins. Co., Ib., 495; Foxcroft v. Mallet, 4 How., 353; Rowan v.
Runnels, 5 How., 134.) (Scott, 603)
In this passage, he nakedly asserted that “international law” or “universal jurisprudence”
authorized the Court’s disregard of Missouri law on questions of slave status. For that
conclusion, however, he cited only the four commercial law cases that appear at the end of the
block quote above, each of which stood for the general proposition that commercial cases in
diversity would be treated as subject to the general law. None addressed slave status in any way.
Only the last of these citations, Rowan v. Runnels, touched on slavery at all, but it too was about
the validity of a contract and could not in any way be taken to hint that slave status was a matter
of general law.
Such authority as there was ran against Curtis pretty strongly. Cases like Groves v.
Slaughter (1841)31 and Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842)32 were not especially on point but
emphasized the local quality of the law of slavery with the exception of fugitive slave cases.
More importantly, this was the place to confront Strader. Strader was the very foundation of
31

In Groves, the question was whether the federal commerce clause restricted Mississippi’s power
to bar sales of slaves into its territory from out of state. Six of the seven participating justices embraced
firm state control over apparently everything to do with slavery within the state’s borders.
32
In Prigg, the Court confronted the question whether states might legislate the procedures for the
return of fugitive slaves. For the Court, Justice Story recited the usual declaration that slavery was “a
mere municipal regulation” (Prigg v. Pennsylvania 1842, 611) that could not create an obligation outside
the state to return a fugitive. Only the Constitution’s fugitive slave clause could positively do that, and he
read that clause to place power over fugitive rendition exclusively in the federal government. Although
the clause thus federalized one discrete area of slave law, Prigg reinforced the notion that each state might
have its own law of personal status and bore no obligation to involve itself in that of any other state.
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Justice Samuel Nelson’s opinion, joined by a majority of the Court, which held that, whatever
the effect of foreign laws within their own territories, Missouri was entitled to determine the
status of its own inhabitants (Scott, 462-65). Taney, too, relied explicitly on Strader (453). But
Curtis did not even address the case.
Read strictly for its holding, Strader did not absolutely exclude the possibility that
personal status might prove a matter of general law in diversity, since that precise question was
not before the Court; it only held that personal status was not a federal question that could create
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court on appeal from a state court. Read with any sort of good faith,
however, Strader stood as a clear declaration from the Court that the law of personal status was
state law to which federal courts must defer. Groves, Prigg, and Strader, in effect, sought to
minimize points of interstate friction on slavery questions by giving every state firm authority
over its own inhabitants, except when the national government stepped in to return fugitive
slaves. These cases, then, and especially Strader, clearly called for federal courts to adhere to
state policies when cases came before them. By strong implication, the Court had decided against
creating an independent general law of status that might invite the Scotts and others in their
position into federal court, in search of foreign judges willing to hear freedom suits and craft a
law more to their liking.
Moreover, the Strader Court had promulgated these principles of state autonomy without
pertinent challenge or qualification from any member of the Court only a few years before. Here
is the critical language of Strader, which vindicated forum law in a case that turned on whether
certain Kentucky slaves had gained their freedom when rented out to work in Ohio:
Every state has an undoubted right to determine the status, or domestic and social
condition, of the persons domiciled within its territory; except in so far as the powers of
the states in this respect are restrained, or duties and obligations imposed upon them, by
the Constitution of the United States. There is nothing in the Constitution of the United

66

States that can in any degree control the law of Kentucky upon this subject. And the
condition of the negroes, therefore, as to freedom or slavery, after their return, depended
altogether upon the laws of that state, and could not be influenced by the laws of Ohio. It
was exclusively in the power of Kentucky to determine for itself whether their
employment in another state should or should not make them free on their return. The
Court of Appeals [of Kentucky] have determined, that by the laws of the state they
continued to be slaves. And their judgment upon this point is, upon this writ of error,
conclusive upon this court, and we have no jurisdiction over it. (Strader v. Graham 1850,
93-94)
In the same opinion, Taney declared without challenge that even the federal Northwest
Ordinance, were it still the law of Ohio,33 could have no authority in Kentucky, except such as
Kentucky chose to give it: “The Ordinance in question, if still in force, could have no more
operation than the laws of Ohio in the state of Kentucky, and could not influence the decision
upon the rights of the master or the slaves in that state, nor give this court jurisdiction upon the
subject” (Strader, 94). This remark was not holding perhaps, but it was closely related to the
ratio decidendi and went unchallenged (because it was obviously correct). And it spoke almost
exactly to the Scott scenario, with the Northwest Ordinance playing the part of the Missouri
Compromise. If Strader did not technically rule out the creation of a general law of personal
status, it emphatically expressed the convictions of every member of the Court in 1850 that the
states retained complete control on questions of slave status, even in the Scotts’ circumstances.
Here was a very steep hill for Curtis to climb, but he did not even acknowledge its
existence. Rather than confront the language of Strader, he simply asserted the applicability of
an international law and a general jurisprudence that would have armed the federal courts to
intrude into the slave states’ law of status in unprecedented ways and in deep tension with the
Strader precedent. Such an unanticipated result could hardly have seemed less political to the
33

The Ordinance governed Ohio and other states-to-be when they were territories, but lost its legal
force when these territories became states. There were those who claimed that the Ordinance’s abolition
of slavery in those territories disabled the subsequent states from ever introducing slavery as well, but that
argument never cut much ice and was rejected, in dictum but without dissent, by Strader.
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slave states than the Missouri Supreme Court’s adoption of a new rule of comity seemed to
Curtis.
If Curtis could not find a way to compel Missouri to recognize foreign emancipations,
then he had no basis as a judge for discussing the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise
at all. But he wanted to discuss the constitutionality of the Compromise so that he could defend
federal power against assertions of slaveholders’ rights. He had to create some law that would
allow the Supreme Court to control the Missouri courts on local questions of personal status. To
do so, he ignored and defied the unanimous declarations of the Strader justices.
Curtis offered no legal basis for treating questions of slave status in the American context
as matters of general law on a par with Swift’s questions of commercial law. And, as I’ve argued
above, this was far from the only question in the case that Curtis seems to have manipulated.
Identifying only one significant manipulation and admitting his abiding admiration for Curtis,
Earl Maltz (2007b) nevertheless concludes that, “When his political beliefs were strongly
engaged, even a judge as committed to legal ideology as Curtis was willing to twist doctrine in
order to vindicate those beliefs” (276). I think it clear that Curtis did quite a bit of doctrinetwisting, climaxing with his willful refusal to respect Strader and apply Missouri law to the
Scotts.34 As I’ve further suggested, none of this implies that Curtis deserves condemnation.
Contrary to Graber, I think it likely that the times called for an unjudicial ruling, if that was the
34

There remains the claim that Missouri law itself was on the Scotts’ side. That is, even when
applying Strader, some have argued that the relevant Missouri law was not that in the Missouri
Supreme Court’s own Scott opinion but that in its earlier case law. I’ve always found that claim
a little much, since it effectively denies a state supreme court the authority to adjust its law to
changing circumstances or overrule its prior decisions. But, in any case, Curtis did very little
with this argument: he quoted the argument of the dissenter in the Missouri court, who of course
opposed the majority’s new articulation of Missouri law but lost; and he cited without discussion
some Supreme Court precedent that said that the Court was not necessarily bound by the most
recent state case in determining state law. But he did not discuss these cases or develop the
argument, preferring instead to focus on the claim discussed in the main text here.
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only way for a person in Curtis’s position to draw a line against slaveholder power. But the right
thing to do is not necessarily the judicial thing to do.

III. CONCLUSION
His ruminations on “constitutional evil” to one side, Mark Graber’s Dred Scott and the
Problem of Constitutional Evil (2006) is one of the most imaginative and insightful works of
constitutional history in recent times. Read critically and synthesized with a fertile collection of
other recent work, it repositions Scott in a narrative of “the slaveholding republic.” In this new
narrative, the Scott case is one climax of a constitutional history that recognizes the thorough
implication of the Constitution in the perpetuation of slavery after 1787, both in the courts and in
the social and political practices that worked together to establish constitutional meaning. I have
tried to show that a review of these studies and the Scott opinions implies that by 1857 there
remained little or no scope for a genuinely judicial opinion of the Supreme Court that would
emancipate the Scotts. I want to emphasize that I am not saying that it was impossible, only that
my review of Curtis’s failed effort to do so demonstrates how little scope there was and how
desperate the plight of the Constitution had become for those who would resist the South
judicially rather than politically. In my judgment, Curtis confronted this predicament by
choosing to be on the right side of history rather than adhere to a construction of the law that was
true to the available materials.
In some ways, the greatest achievement of Graber’s book, one that this essay is meant to
vindicate, is its demonstration of the indispensability of a broad-gauged constitutional history,
fully encompassing all of the nation’s political institutions and dynamics, to any adequate history
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of the courts’ encounters with the Constitution. My reliance on Freehling and related works is
meant to show the benefits of pressing even more broadly into the history of the times, if one
wants to understand what courts are up to and up against. After all, the sources of law can never
just be formal legal texts; they cannot help but include the governed society’s common
assumptions--and often actively disputed assumptions--about the essentials of its social
dynamics, its economic life, and its peace and safety.
The broader history teaches us, among other things, that racism deeply infected the
Constitution and all of American culture, as did slavery. Taney’s and Curtis’s Scott opinions
battled over the proper way to implement what both understood as a more or less deeply racist
Constitution. If Curtis rejected Taney’s assertion that the Constitution was made only for the
white race, he nevertheless remained comfortable with the Constitution’s accommodation of the
pervasive, racist degradation of so many of his fellow Americans. In fact, his opinion embraced a
power to deny citizenship--national citizenship as well as state citizenship--merely on the basis
of race. And, of course, the Constitution offered substantial protection to racist slavery, at least
by means of the fugitive slave clause, which Curtis defended, and the three-fifths clause.35
Oddly, though, Curtis has come down to us as a hero because at the climactic moment of his
professional life, he chose to resist the full claims of slaveholder power under this racist
Constitution. Because American historians and intellectuals of all stripes now unanimously share
values closer to those of Benjamin Curtis--in that one moment, anyway--than to those of Roger
Taney, it has proven extraordinarily difficult for them to see the polemical qualities of Curtis’s
opinion and the judicial craftsmanship in Taney’s.
In the second half of this essay, I have offered some technical analysis of the Taney and
35

Curtis’s constitutional thinking and pointed racism are given valuable treatment in Streichler

(2005).
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Curtis opinions in light of the socioconstitutional history laid out in the first half. That analysis
largely vindicates the legal quality of Taney’s opinion. However much we might criticize Taney
for absorbing the slave states’ pathologies and reading them into law, he did so largely in proper,
judicial fashion under a Constitution that broadly accommodated racist slavery. And he did so in
an effort to pit the pacifying authority of law against the appalling violence seemingly threatened
by the course of the political branches, by the Northern “abolitionists,” and (not least) by his own
section’s secessionist radicals. It is also true, however, that the substance of Taney’s ruling
threatened to entrench ever more deeply the national power of the slaveholding class and the
geographic reach of slavery itself. This result, apparently, Curtis could not endorse. Where
Taney slipped over the line to unjudicial conduct only once and only briefly (though very
clearly), Curtis, in my judgment, did so frequently and importantly, rendering his opinion as a
whole more a political shot across the bow than a judicial opinion. It remains unclear why Curtis
resigned shortly after the case was decided, but, with Scott on the books, it seems fitting that he
could no longer see himself on the bench.
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